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Heinz Peter Gerhardt 
From Migrant to Citizen: 
Questioning and Learning in Lisbon 
 
Germany‘s Federal Agency for Civic Education organised a 
conference from 26-28 April 2007 under the title, ‘Networking 
European Citizenship Education’. The subtitle, ‘Rethinking Citizen-
ship Education in European Migration, Political Strategies – 
Educational Concepts’ sounded just as complicated and ambitious. Is 
this combination a formula for the success of such an endeavour? It 
could be, if the ambition were to be coupled with openness, and 
shared by partners, participants, presenters and organisers alike. An 
openness and tolerance, which were – that much can be said in 
advance - hard to bear at times.  
 
 
First Day: Descriptions, Hypotheses and Temperaments 
 
Rita Süβmuth (rita-suessmuth.de) started with a description of her 
experiences in the area of migration and human rights, to which her 
current work in this field is dedicated (cf. her keynote “Citizenship 
and Immigration in a Globalised World: European Perspectives” in 
this volume). 
 
Migration policies should not differentiate between more welcome 
migrants and less welcome migrants, e.g. in Germany: Eastern Euro-
peans or German Russians for the former, and Africans for the latter. 
National policies which give preference to immigrants with specific 
competencies and knowledge are only acceptable, when, like in the 
USA, Canada and Brazil, the right to political asylum, in the case of 
human rights violations in the country of origin, is upheld. Local 
authorities are the ones to implement Migration policies in the 
communities. The aim is, for migrants and members of the host 
society alike, to live together harmoniously and productively. Migrant 
organisations should be involved in this implementation. 
 
Whilst Rita Süβmuth represented the voice of a host society, the next 
speaker was expected to present the view of the incomer. That the 
writer Abdourahman A. Waberi (his latest novel was, ‘United States 
of Africa’, Paris: Lattès 2006) did not live up to this expectation, 
might have been either due to his heavily accented English, or a 
deliberate choice. Waberi’s main issue was with the concept of 
‘francophonie’: although he moved to France from Djibouti for his 
university studies, and writes in French, he refuses to be considered a 
francophone writer from the ‘periphery’ (cf. his speech ”The 
boundless kingdom of imagination” in this volume) Francophonie, he 
argued, is a neo-colonial instrument for the domestication of the 
cultural elite, mainly in Africa. Numerous French-writing authors are 
neither French, nor want to bow to a Francophonie, where France with 
its language is still seen as the universal benefactor, concerned with 
giving civilisation to the people living in the darkness. An author’s use 
of French should not be measured by the rule sticks of the French 
grammar book, France’ history and culture. 
 
Almost facetiously, Waberi responded to what he felt was the 
audience’s expectation for him to make a statement on Islam. Yes, in 
his country of origin Islam still is a dominant force. However, he 
himself hardly practises the religion. ‘I have to play the Muslim now’ 
was heard throughout the conference, and not just by him. The debate 
about Islam seems to force all sides to make statements, something 
that would have been unnecessary a few years ago. 
 
The next speaker, Kenan Malik (www.kenanmalik.com) divided the 
migration-integration debate into two camps: on the one side, 
assimilationists and on the other, the multiculturalists. The slogan, ‘all 
people have the same rights and duties’ for him summed up the 
position of the former, in which a ‘common set of values’ is required 
(cf. his speech ”Europe and its multinational Project of Integration: 
How to succeed?” in this volume) 
 
On the other side, he shed a new perspective on multiculturalists. He 
addressed them as people who want the different cultures to live 
separately, preferably in their own ghettoes. Each culture is respon-
sible for keeping its own house, i.e. its ghetto, in order. Multi-
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culturalists don’t share the conviction that all members of society 
should the same fundamental values in common. Malik pointed to the 
British example: ‘After the 7 July bombings, Prime Minister Blair, in 
his television address, did not ask British Muslims directly, but 
Islamic community leaders, to ‘keep their house in order’. 
 
In Germany, the Interior Minister Schäuble, is doing something 
similar with his German Conferences on Islam, even though I have not 
seen this criticised in the press yet. The key aim always seems to be to 
ensure that the chosen community leaders are representative and 
legitimate. And about this at every new edition of the Conference 
breaks out a fierce discussion. In my opinion, suchlike discussions are 
an attempt to enter into a debate with Germans of migrant back-
ground, in whose communities may reside marginal elements that 
pose a threat to the host country. Now, more than ever, it seems to me 
a crucial political prerequisite to ask migrants of Muslim faith and 
their representatives to accept the fundamental principles of peaceful 
cohabitation within their host country. This means also that they are 
required to institutionalise their faith - based communities and its 
migrant or non–migrant members. These institutions would enable the 
civil society and the state to enter into contracts and agreements, with 
clearly stated rules and duties on both sides. Concordats, trade union 
agreements and public-private partnerships are the historic precedents 
and current role models within a representative democracy, such as 
Germany.  
 
The multiculturalists, who are much maligned today, started on this 
stony path in the former Federal Republic of Germany. To start with, 
institutional boulders had to be moved. Nobody felt responsible for 
the guest workers that were invited. The multiculturalists were one of 
the first to offer language courses to migrants, first in their mother 
tongue, later also in German, which was then followed by 
employment rights and responsibilities. The recognition of the 
respective migrant histories, including their contribution to the 
development of the host country (e.g. since 1981 the series, ‘For-
eigners in Berlin’ by the first Berlin Officer for Integration, Barbara 
John), was the basis for the development of a certain national pride 
reflected both within the migrant communities, and towards the 
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outside. The creation of an Office for Multicultural Affairs, the first of 
which was set up in Frankfurt in 1989 with the political refugee 
Daniel Cohn-Bendit as its first, unpaid office holder, marked another 
step on the multiculturalists’ march through the institutions. Other city 
councils and local authorities followed suit. 
 
Cohn–Bendit’s vivid account about these beginnings and the common 
rules for a new type of homeland were put down together in 1992 with 
Thomas Schmid under the programmatic title: “Heimat Babylon” 
(Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe). 
 
The podium discussion that followed Malik’s speech was enriched 
mainly by the Czech PhD student Muhic Dizdarevic (Charles Uni-
versity, Prague). Her depiction, in easy-to-follow English, of the 
Czech situation, taking into account the previous presentations, was, 
for me, a sign for the openness of the conference: it is rare for a PhD 
student to sit alongside professors and other illustrious personalities. 
Her short intervention (cf. her “Statement for the Discussion Panel in 
this volume) regarding the widespread ignorance of the minority 
(Roma) and migration question (people of Chinese or Vietnamese 
origin, increasingly also from Eastern Europe) in the Czech Republic 
was extremely interesting. 
 
 
Second Day: History Lessons for the European citizen 
 
History lessons kicked off the start of the programme for day two. Ute 
Frevert (Yale University) reminded us of immigration to the USA: 
from the voluntary (founding fathers) to the forced (slaves), to the 
annual Green-Card lottery for qualified migrants worldwide today; a 
history of inclusion and exclusion (native inhabitants). Her daughter’s 
school experiences provided a vivid illustration: in her history classes, 
‘history’ is being interpreted as ‘heritage’. Each child has to research 
and present her own family’s migration history, as an example for the 
migration story of the specific ethnic minority or nation. Building on 
these contributions to the US-American nation and culture, Frevert 
pleaded for a ‘citizenship education’, which places at its core ‘the 
rights, duties and entitlements’ of its citizens. In the US schools, 
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democratic values are learnt and practised. It is Frevert’s belief that 
this practice has come to bear fruit in ‘grassroots’ movements, which, 
for example, fight for the right for abortion. ‘Participatory Demo-
cracy’ is the term she coined for this ‘hard to get at’ achievement in 
the North American and European History.  
 
The next speaker, Paul Scheffer, from the University of Amsterdam, 
built on Frevert’s presentation by urging us to review and disseminate 
our own European migration histories Cf. his contribution ”The Land 
of Arrival. How Migration is changing Europe” in this volume). This 
would show the emergence of nation states as a continuous process, 
accompanied by multiple conflicts, which in turn led to the 
redefinition of the very bases of society. Historical research shows 
that the integration of groups of migrants can be represented on a 
linear continuum, from the initial rejection to isolation, through to 
confrontation and criticism. However, host societies and migrant 
groups have always found a modus vivendi of peaceful cohabitation. 
Migrant groups, whether implicitly or explicitly, always throw into 
question the way a nation sees itself. According to Scheffer, we 
should have the courage to ask ourselves the same questions as those 
we ask migrants in their immigration or citizenship tests. This could 
possibly result in other questions being raised, and might change our 
understanding of our nation state. 
 
In this presentation, as in the discussion that followed, the theme was 
the ‘Islamic threat’: September 11 as the constant warning on the 
wall? I liked Scheffer, as when he emphatically demanded the right of 
Muslim immigrants not to be religious or join another faith commu-
nity. His was clearly an encouraging refusal to bow to the noticeable 
pressure during this conference to make a stance on one’s religion of 
origin, i.e. to play the Muslim, Christian or Buddhist. However, too 
few conference participants adopted his refusal.  
 
‘Pride and Shame’ for the history of one’s country or own ethnic 
group could have been the result of Scheffer’s historical reflections. 
For his country stands for Rembrand and Vermeer and, at the same 
time, for its participation in the slave trade and in colonial 
exploitation.  
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These morning presentations rounded up the conference’s first round 
of plenary sessions. The six workshops that followed were an 
opportunity to explore and discuss the arguments in more depth. I 
decided on Workshop 2: ‘How to become a good (European) citizen: 
standards, subjects and models’. Unfortunately, in my workshop as in 
the others, more presentations were the norm and were shoehorned 
into the available time by the coordinators. I decided to stay in the 
same workshop. Even if not all topics interested me in the same way, I 
would at least be able to participate in its group dynamics. 
 
Friedrich Heckmann from the University of Bamberg (Germany) was 
the coordinator. In his working group at the European Forum for 
Migration Studies he had already developed proposals for integration 
courses well before these became compulsory for immigrants. At the 
moment, these courses are piloted in cities, such as Nürnberg. This 
was followed by other participants presenting research, undertaken as 
part of their academic studies or not, on citizenship integration courses 
in European countries. What all these had in common was that each 
time the concepts of Britishness, Deutschsein, Etre francais, etc, were 
to be operationalised in the test papers, they bordered on the 
ridiculous. For example: 
• Which colour are the claws of the German Federal Eagle? 
• What would you do when in a pub in England you accidentally 
spill someone’s beer? 
My guess is that this clumsiness in expressing national characteristics 
is based on three factors: 
• Instigated by politicians, civil servants undertake this task, and 
whilst they are aware of recommendations emanating from 
research and numerous NGOs, these are mostly ignored at this 
stage 
• As these tasks are usually undertaken under time pressure, there 
is no time to organise a public debate, e.g. consultations on the 
products proposed (with the exception of legislative procedures) 
• The lack of broad societal consensus on the necessary 
foundations for active citizenship in European countries was 
evidenced by all presentations, whether these applied to resident 
citizens or to newcomers.  
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Taking the example of the Netherlands (the murder of Theo van 
Gogh) and Denmark (the row over the Muhammad cartoons), the 
workshop could verify the validity of Scheffer’s thesis, i.e. that a 
reflection about fundamental values only occurs in times of crisis. The 
Danish presenter, Per Mouritsen, University of Aarhus, demonstrated 
how the caricatures incident made the Danish realise just how vital a 
role irony and jokes play in the Danish political debate. Even those 
critical of the cartoons in question defended the right of the 
caricaturist to publish these drawings. Ines Michalowski, from the 
University of Münster, concluded that the citizenship examinations 
increasingly test knowledge, (language) skills and attitudes towards 
the host culture. Europe as a continent and as a political project, 
however, doesn’t enter the equation. 
 
The last point formed the main issue presented by Fiorella Dell’Olio, 
Cambridge University, who studied the discourses in peace education, 
global learning and multiculturalism. The realisation of our life 
circumstances, whether in its physical or moral guise, has to be 
considered and dealt with in a global context. Why struggle to become 
a national citizen, involving a lot of effort from all sides, and then 
become a European and World citizen? Not without some flaws, 
Dell’Olio advocated for a citizenship education for the One World, 
which prepares people for life in an open and democratic society. In 
this way, Dell’Olio represented the broadest interpretation of 
citizenship education, one that dispenses of the nation state. Both the 
workshop and the following ‘laboratory’ in the same room – the 
difference between the two was not entirely clear to me – supported 
the view that there needs to be some form of organised encouragement 
for migrants to take an active part in their host society. However, what 
form this should take was the object of fierce discussion. 
 
As far as I was concerned, these stimulating discussions convinced me 
that with each arrival of a new group of migrants society needs to 
reformulate its ‘social contract’ (J. J. Rousseau). But this requires that 
all previous contract partners are aware of the new contract, and agree 
to subscribe and implement its values and content, as opposed to only 
the new signatories. The process for formulating this ‘volonté 
générale’ would follow probably Scheffer’s timeline.  
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With hindsight the discussions, which took place in the workshops 
and laboratories, were clear and rigorous, despite a certain amount of 
dissatisfaction being voiced about the type of discussion and the 
overall purpose of the conference. For myself, it represented an 
opportunity for personal development. I noticed, however, that in 
particular representatives of ministerial agencies and departments, and 
representatives of organisations with specific purposes (e.g. the 
development of learning programmes), expected more practical 
outcomes and results, which they could implement in their work. I had 
the impression that these individuals were familiar with the basic 
arguments put forward by speakers and presenters, and now wanted to 
move on to some kind of hands – on activity to a citizenship education 
of migrants in Europe, or at least, to the curricular cornerstones of 
such an education. Basically, if this unique organisation in Europe, the 
Federal Agency for Civic Education, is able to set up and organise 
such a European Network, then why not thrash out first good practice 
‘solutions’ in the presence of so much expertise? I would recommend 
to whoever organises the follow-up conference in Sofia in September/ 
October 2008, taking more into consideration this kind of expectation 
and readiness. 
 
The conference – the third of its type in a series planned by the 
Federal Agency – was entitled ‘Networking European Citizenship 
Education’. I have rarely participated in an event where the expression 
‘networking’ could have applied more. All participants took an active 
part in it: 
• Cooperation partners: I counted 9 from 5 countries; staying in 
the background, they did not want to impose their own agendas 
• Speakers, presenters: for the majority chosen righteously for 
their topic  
• Participants: about 200, very diverse from 29 countries 
The eagerness with which all participants discussed these pressing 
European issues from the standpoint of their own perspective was 
certainly impressive. Apart from those already mentioned, there was 
the young, enthusiastic note-taking lawyer for African migrants, from 
Lisbon; two teachers from comprehensive schools in Cologne; the 
secretary of an NGO in Rotherham/England; the multilingual political 
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analyst from Berlin, the woman on placement at the Friedrich-Ebert 
Foundation in Lisbon; the impatient curriculum developer from 
Enschede; the co-organising director of the Goethe Institute; the 
reserved Programme coordinator from Belgrade; the European film 
manger and the Oral History Expert, both from Berlin – all were 
visibly willing to contribute to the re-shaping of the European 
migration space. 
 
To begin with I described the conference’s underpinning theme as 
complicated and ambitious. Complicated, in terms of linguistic 
communication (‘We all speak bad English’), the remits of the 
working groups (workshops, laboratories – although the tasks were 
written down, my group ignored them mostly) and the lacking focus 
on results. 
 
And ambitious: the issues that Europe faces as an immigration 
continent remain unresolved. The balancing act between safeguarding 
‘fortress Europe’ on the one hand (e.g. the establishment of the 
European border Agency Frontex in Warsaw), and immigration 
legislation in the US or Canadian style, is being felt in each country. 
Seen this way, the ambition to find a European middle way cannot be 
strong enough. The next conference would do well to involve 
additional stakeholders in the Europe immigration continent theme, 
such as, for example, migrant organisations and security agencies. 
These stakeholders should also join the European Migration Societies 
Network. 
 
 
Day 3: Learning from the United States 
 
The last day saw a captivating talk by José Casanova of the New 
School for Social Research, New York, emphatically introduced by 
Jörg Lau (from the German weekly ‘Die Zeit’). His topic was 
‘Religious Pluralism – European Secular Identities – European 
Integration: Challenges for Citizenship Education’. Similarly to Ute 
Frevert, he praised the US - American ‘nation-building’ model. 
Hyphenated identities are the norm, without this being considered as a 
threat, through a supposed lack of identification with the host nation. 
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Even religious connections are being perceived as a resource rather 
than a threat. His research on the Catholic community in the US, with 
its allegiance to the Pope in Rome, i.e. to a power residing outside of 
the nation-state, was evidence for his viewpoint. He foresaw a similar 
process for the Muslim migrants in Europe. His warning was to avoid 
the imposition of a Christian-based cultural dominance in Europe (e.g. 
in the European Constitution). 
 
If ethnic origin and non-Christian faiths are to be viewed as a source 
of revitalisation for the European Union and its member states, it 
looks like we have a long way to go. 
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Rita Süssmuth 
Citizenship and Immigration in a Globalised World: 
European Perspectives 
 
Dear Colleague President Krüger, dear participants.  
Thank you first of all for your welcoming words. 
 
I am very happy to join you this morning in Lisbon and speak about a 
very important topic – citizenship of migrants. What does citizenship 
mean not only for migrants, but also for those who live with migrants 
– what does it mean for our societies? I think you have made a won-
derful choice by coming to Lisbon. Why? Because the next EU presi-
dency will be Portugal's, and the main topic will be: Citizenship. I 
think my friend António Vitorino - the former Portuguese EU com-
missioner – who is among us this morning, has highlighted the impor-
tance of citizenship on the European agenda. Let me stress that Citi-
zenship is not only a question of participation, it is also a question of 
human rights. Nothing is more controversial – I believe – than dealing 
with migration issues via a human rights approach. I experienced this 
first hand during the debates we had in the Global Commission on In-
ternational Migration. We were very glad that especially Kofi Annan 
pushed this approach, because issues of citizenship are very much 
linked to the question of rights and obligations. Reservations against a 
human rights approach are still strong and widespread. This shows 
that many people still think in terms of social and political exclusion. 
The most important question and the biggest problem with regard to 
integration is the lack of inclusion. For this reason, I am very happy 
the Portuguese presidency intends to follow a comprehensive ap-
proach to dealing with the citizenship of migrants in Europe. If you 
exclude citizenship, you are taking a very particular and not a com-
prehensive approach. I strongly believe that we should stop putting 
people into different categories. As Mr. Krüger has told us, the French 
example shows that even a very progressive naturalization policy does 
not necessarily and automatically mean that problems of social and 
cultural exclusion are solved for good. 
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But it is important to ask: Are we really practising multiculturalism, or 
are we just living side by side? And the other question is: Why do we 
hesitate so much when it comes to giving civic rights to migrants? 
Sometimes when we speak of immigrants, we avoid using the word 
"citizens". As a matter of fact, it is not only a question of rethinking 
citizenship, but also of thinking fundamentally about the citizenship of 
the people living in our countries. An ethnic approach can – I believe 
– create more problems than we are able to solve. Nobody should be 
allowed to differentiate between ethnicities which are welcome and 
others which are not. What we need is a human approach which looks 
at people as individuals with different backgrounds and different tal-
ents and asks about their potential for living together peacefully and 
productively. This is – I believe – the cardinal issue in the 21st cen-
tury. It is therefore very important to take a comprehensive approach 
to citizenship education, one which encompasses other areas of civic 
life. We may have good citizenship education, but if we fail to inte-
grate migrants fully into our educational systems in general and into 
the labour market and the political system, we will not be able to make 
any real progress in this area. 
 
In order to show you what "Citizenship and Immigration in a Global-
ised World – European Perspectives" means to me, I would like to 
highlight three different aspects. First of all, let me stress that Europe's 
problems in the field of migration and integration should no longer be 
regarded as a national affair and a domestic concern which can be dis-
cussed and decided at the national level only. More or less, we recog-
nise today that no single state alone can solve the problems confront-
ing us. What we have come to comprehend is that the European 
Commission has been much more progressive, looking for more coop-
eration and coordination. However, it has had to overcome high barri-
ers, because the member states have consistently defended national 
decision-making processes in order not to have to shift national au-
thority to European institutions. As a member of the Global Commis-
sion, I have myself witnessed similar processes. On the one hand, one 
could discern a need for a globalised view in order to identify the 
scale of migration in an interconnected world. On the other hand, one 
could observe strong opposition from a lot of countries, above all the 
USA, to ceding influence to the UN on this topic and to conducting 
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governance and management at a global level. There has been a first 
high-level dialogue, but we can only hope for a second and a third 
round of discourse in the near future. 
 
Secondly, there are more than 200 million people migrating some-
where in the world every year. From our perspective, Europe might 
appear to be the most severely affected continent. That was true for a 
certain time, but it is no longer true now. If we take a global view, we 
soon realise that it is the American, Asian (i.e. the former CIS) and 
especially the African continents that are bearing the brunt of the mi-
gration processes. We can learn from this global perspective and we 
must acknowledge that migration is not a transitional phenomenon, 
but a persistent one. 
 
Looking back in history, many European countries have a similar tra-
dition of immigration in the form of the recruitment of "guest work-
ers" in the 1950s and 1960s. Policies were not aimed at granting mi-
grants citizenship of their host countries. Instead, the belief at the time 
was that labour migrants should stay for a few years and then return to 
their home countries. But reality proved to be different, as Max Frisch, 
a Swiss author, succinctly put it: "We asked for a work force and we 
got human beings." 
  
Clearly, we have to take today's different and new patterns of migra-
tion into account and adapt our civic education programmes to the 
new situation. Many of our national policies are focused on long-term, 
permanent settlement, and not on temporary residence. Nonetheless, a 
gradual change in the nature of migration is taking place around the 
world, the model of permanent settlement is giving way to a fluid and 
ongoing process of immigration and emigration, i.e. circular migra-
tion. You start off in one country, move to another country and per-
haps in the end you settle down in one or the other or you return to 
your country of origin. Then you might even start all over again. This 
shows the dynamic nature of modern migration. Consequently, we 
have to include the situation of temporary as well as permanent mi-
grants in our deliberations, and we have to adjust our notions of civic 
rights accordingly. 
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Let me come to my third point: When using the term integration we 
may come up against various misunderstandings; at best the term is 
open to different interpretations and thus causes many difficulties. In 
many countries integration is conceived in the sense of adaptation and 
assimilation. In this respect, host countries expect migrants to conform 
to the local living conditions in the host society. Far too often, gov-
ernments fail to ask their own citizens to adapt to living with migrants. 
How the term integration is interpreted is therefore very important. In 
my own country, integration has recently become a priority topic of 
discussion. Like other European countries, Germany was for a long 
time reluctant to admit that it was a destination country for immigra-
tion. It was in denial about its status as an immigration country, seeing 
itself only as a host country for temporary migrants. But in reality it 
had – long since – become an immigration country. The migrants were 
expected to learn the language, to follow the values and the rules of 
the countries they were now living in. No thought was given to how to 
deal with their personal backgrounds and their cultures, nor to how 
they might impact on and bring about changes in culture in our own 
societies. 
 
When in my own country Wolfgang Schäuble, the Federal Minister of 
the Interior, pointed out that integration means not only learning how 
to live with Muslims, but also how to integrate their culture and their 
religion, this was more than just a new approach, it was a revolution-
ary approach. In some German cities, even the issue of building a new 
mosque gives rise to a lot of controversial debates. If you do not have 
the right to participate as citizens in these decision-making processes, 
you will soon feel alienated and not at home. People from different 
cultures with diverse ethnic backgrounds should be considered full 
members of our societies, enriching us, not as a threat. It is therefore 
important to discuss the social, economic and political context of civic 
education in any immigration country. 
 
Until recently, we did not really invite the migrants and their organisa-
tions to join us in solving the problems. It is, thus, very crucial not just 
to make policy in favour of migrants, but to make policy together with 
migrants. The right to vote is important, but a comprehensive concept 
of citizenship education has to embrace the migrants themselves, the 
 18
individuals and their organisations. I have learned a lot from women’s 
issues to the effect that it is not enough just to define the needs and 
necessities of women, or of migrants, or of the disadvantaged. Instead, 
we need to include them and invite them to participate, at the local 
community level, at the regional, national and international level. I 
have also learned a lot from NGOs. A comparison of European coun-
tries clearly shows that the more open they are to civil society, the 
more qualified they are to solve problems and to find better solutions. 
We do know that migration and integration are always accompanied 
by tensions and conflicts, but this is part of the dynamics of our socie-
ties. 
 
It is a pity that for decades some European states, and also my own 
country, continued to be convinced that we require a homogeneous 
society in order to manage immigration successfully. Unquestionably, 
we need to create a common understanding of our similarities and dif-
ferences. No society can survive in the long term without reaching a 
consensus on how to live together. The substance of our constitution, 
of our rights and obligations is always an essential part of civic educa-
tion. I do believe that the word "integration" is not always appropriate: 
we should rather see ourselves as navigating between different cul-
tures. Cultures which come together are mutually enriching, they can 
promote development, provided that we are willing to learn and to 
overcome our ignorance. Civic education must serve to bring these 
different cultures together to promote learning from other continents, 
and ultimately to accomplish global education. Since many countries 
in Europe have not even reached the stage of Europeanized education, 
it is going to prove a great challenge to achieve the global education 
stage. 
 
In recent years, the question of the rights and obligations of migrants 
has become a topic of paramount interest. We are at the stage of de-
veloping the concepts and programmes, but we cannot yet implement 
them. Thanks to all the experts in this hall, we already know a lot, but 
we are far from putting the expertise into practice. Let me propose not 
repeating what we already know, but reflecting on how to implement 
it. For this purpose, it is essential to get together, to learn from one 
another, to form networks, and to define common European standards. 
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It cannot be that a migrant coming from a third country finds accept-
able conditions in one country, in another not at all. If we have a 
European political and cultural identity of multiculturalism, we need 
some shared principles and some agreements on how to act within 
these 27 states. It is not sufficient to claim we can resolve this at the 
national level. In 1999, with the launch of the Tampere process, the 
first activities in harmonising procedures at the European level were 
established, but these concentrated on refugees only. As you can see, 
it has been only a very short time since we started thinking of changes 
in our societies from a more European perspective. 
 
Finally, I would like to stress that we need to look for good practice at 
an European level. There are two further aspects I would like to com-
ment on: 
 
Firstly, whenever I hear all the arguments in Germany claiming that it 
is not possible to integrate people from developing countries, from 
cultures which are so different from European cultures, I think we 
should look to the many examples of work by citizens' initiatives, by 
NGOs such as foundations, associations, sometimes research results, 
that show that integration is indeed possible and working. When con-
fronted with the situation of "unintegrated" children – young people 
who are perceived as unwilling to integrate – we ought to ask our-
selves how we could have allowed this to happen in the first place. 
This kind of refusal is very often a response to frustration with and 
failures of the educational system. Nowadays, we have numerous ex-
amples to show that integration can be successful, provided that it 
starts early enough in childhood and incorporates the ideas put for-
ward by the foundations and NGOs. 
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I would never have expected to see something like the German Con-
ference on Islam11
                                                
 bringing together different groups of Muslim or-
ganisations and individuals at the national level. It shows that there are 
steps forward, but there are always steps backward as well. These 
steps backward – especially at the political level – are often due to ef-
forts to cater to the expectations of voters who are dissatisfied and dis-
approve of migrants. To avoid relapsing into old patterns, politicians 
and educators need to adopt a leading role in this context. Without ef-
fective leadership in a society, we will not be able to make any pro-
gress. Addressing the various stakeholders, I have already spoken 
about the NGOs, but we also need to consider the very important role 
of the business sector. If we want to make full use of the human po-
tential and human capital of migrants, we cannot rely on civic educa-
tion alone. Business and the corporate sector have to play a role. This 
approach calls for participation at different levels, in different projects 
at a national and transnational level. Whenever we have been able to 
bring migrants and non-migrants together in projects, we have wit-
nessed a change of thinking, a change of attitudes. We have solved 
problems together. Whereas we speak a lot of national identity, it is 
local identity that can provide us with another approach, just take the 
example of big cities like Dublin or Stuttgart or any other city. "I am 
not interested in your passports," the mayors of these cities say, "but I 
tell you, you are all Dubliners, you all are Stuttgart citizens, and we 
have to stick together to solve our problems together, to foster creativ-
ity among our citizens and to show we can live together peacefully 
and productively." I think this approach, which takes the city as a 
symbol of an historical forum of citizenship, should be applied all 
over the European Union. This will imply – I say this for my own 
country – giving migrants the right to vote at the local level. That is 
why I cannot understand why an EU citizen who has been living in a 
 
11  The German Conference on Islam, launched by the Federal Minister of the 
Interior Wolfgang Schäuble, was first held in 2006. There are 30 permanent 
participants, 15 of whom are representatives of the German government and 
15 of whom represent Muslims living in Germany. The Conference is 
intended to be a long-term process of negotiation and communication between 
the German state and representatives of Muslims living in Germany, and will 
continue for two to three years. (cf. Federal Ministry of the Interior home 
page) 
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city for just three weeks has the right to vote there, whereas migrants 
who have been living there for 20, 30 or 40 years do not. There is 
clearly a lack of rationality and coherence when it comes to voting 
rights for migrants. And if our constitution does not grant voting rights 
to migrants, we should convince government and parliament to change 
the constitution and adapt it to changing realities. I will stop here and 
encourage you to make the most out of this conference.  
 
Thank you for your attention. 
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Abdourahman A. Waberi 
The Boundless Kingdom of Imagination 
 
“Writers are citizens of many countries: the finite and frontiered 
country of observable and everyday life, the boundless kingdom of 
imagination, the half-lost land of memory” 
Salman Rushdie, text delivered to the International Parliament of 
Writers, november 1993, Strasbourg 
 
When the organisers of this event kindly invited me to deliver this lec-
ture, they suggested something that might reconcile my two worlds – 
the exile (here in its broader sense) in Europe and literature. While 
gathering ideas, feelings and impressions to conceive my topic for to-
day, I thought about the issues that dominate my life the last two dec-
ades: my first years as an African student in Normandy, the first sto-
ries I published at that time and the unsuccessful homecoming in my 
country of birth, Djibouti, the latest French territory to be decolonised 
in June 1977. After five years in Caen, I have been turned out into a 
singularity, that is to say, I became a writer. Because of that peculiar-
ity, I’ve had no other choice but to remain distant from the tight re-
gime of Djibouti and to construct laboriously a self with many layers 
of identity and ties of loyalty. These events constitute my personal his-
tory which is not so different from that of many others. How did I 
succeed in finding my way in that difficult period, a period of pro-
found anxiety, a period of questions and doubts, of small inner volca-
nos, the kind of schizophrenic dislocation experienced by millions of 
migrants throughout the world. Why is the question ‘Who am I?’ not 
longer so problematic and frightening? How did I succeed in finding 
cultural paths and knots both personal and collective? It is quite possi-
ble that I have cured, for the time being at least, the neurosis I was 
facing because I became a manipulator of words, un homme de lettres, 
a man of living in a country of his own imagination. My short intro-
duction jumps over different concepts and difficulties – the complex 
notion of exile for instance - that I am not going to explore and even-
tually solve. It is interesting that the Bible describes naming as a deci-
sive moment of creation. God sets man free through language and 
gives man the power to name the animals. Adam assumes a paramount 
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creative role, just as God did, through words. What is more, Indians 
believe in a universal mind – brahman – of which we are all a part. So, 
the main question (of this introduction) might be: are there rivers and 
bridges, modest or grandiose, that can unit all of us? Is there some-
thing as a collective imagination (imaginaire) founded upon the hu-
man condition beyond time and space ? 
 
1. Problems without Passports  
I could continue discussing my personal problems for quite some time 
but it is more interesting and more challenging to move to serious 
considerations. Our world is facing, to use the former UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan's phrase, numerous "problems without passports" 
– problems of terrorism and counterterrorism, of proliferating con-
flicts, of the degradation of our common planet, of contagious diseases 
and chronic starvation, of human rights and human wrongs, of mass 
illiteracy and massive displacement. These are problems that no one 
country, however powerful, and even no one continent, however pro-
tected, can solve alone. These are surely the shared responsibility of 
humankind. And therefore they cry out for solutions that, like the 
problems themselves, also cross frontiers. It is comprehensible to try 
to ignore worldwide tragedies, to retreat into the private sphere and 
discard depressing issues. Yet an event, or could we call it a sad ‘fait-
divers’, taken place in 1999, still haunts me. Yaguine Koita (aged 14) 
and Fodé Tounkara (aged 15) were born in Conakry, Guinea. On the 
28th of July, they froze to death on a Sabena Airbus (Flight 520) fly-
ing from Conakry, Guinea, to Brussels, Belgium. Their bodies were 
discovered on the 2nd of August in the airplane's rear right-hand 
wheel bay at Brussels International Airport, after having made at least 
three return trips between Conakry and Brussels. The boys were carry-
ing plastic bags with birth certificates, school report cards, photo-
graphs and a letter. This letter, written in imperfect French, was 
widely published in the world media. I will, with your permission, 
quote a few lines of that letter I guess many of you know well. English 
translation of the letter 
“Excellencies, Messrs. members and officials of Europe, We have the 
honorable pleasure and the great confidence in you to write this letter 
to speak to you about the objective of our journey and the suffering of 
us, the children and young people of Africa. But first of all, we present 
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to you life's most delicious, charming and respected greetings. To this 
effect, be our support and our assistance. You are for us, in Africa, 
those to whom it is necessary to request relief. We implore you, for the 
love of your continent, for the feeling that you have towards your peo-
ple and especially for the affinity and love that you have for your chil-
dren whom you love for a lifetime. [Furthermore, for the love and 
meekness of our creator God the omnipotent one who gave you all the 
good experiences, wealth and ability to well construct and well organ-
ize your continent to become the most beautiful one and most admira-
ble among the others]. Messrs. members and officials of Europe, we 
call out for your solidarity and your kindness for the relief of Africa. 
Do help us, we suffer enormously in Africa, we have problems and 
some shortcomings regarding the rights of the child. In terms of prob-
lems, we have war, disease, malnutrition, etc. As for the rights of the 
child in Africa, and especially in Guinea, we have too many schools 
but a great lack of education and training. Only in the private schools 
can one have a good education and good training, but it takes a great 
sum of money. Now, our parents are poor and it is necessary for them 
to feed us. Furthermore, we have no sports schools where we could 
practice soccer, basketball or tennis]. This is the reason, we, African 
children and youth, ask you to create a big efficient organization for 
Africa to allow us to progress. Therefore, if you see that we have sac-
rificed ourselves and risked our lives, this is because we suffer too in 
Africa and that we need you to fight against poverty and to put an end 
to the war in Africa. Nevertheless, we want to learn, and we ask you to 
help us in Africa learn to be like you. Finally, we appeal to you to ex-
cuse us very, very much for daring to write you this letter to you, the 
great personages to whom we owe much respect. And do not forget it 
is to you whom we must lament about the weakness of our abilities in 
Africa. Written by two Guinean children, Yaguine Koita and Fodé 
Tounkara”. 
 
If facts and figures are indeniable, it is not just a question about a set 
of figures on GNP tables, a subject for economists and businessmen. It 
is rather a matter of people. Yes, Africa is indeed now poorer than it 
has ever been. Extreme poverty has multiplied four times over the last 
two decades. More than a third of the continent's inhabitants survive 
on less than half a dollar a day. More "development money" (mostly 
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European) has gone into Africa than the Marshall Plan brought to a 
war-destroyed Europe. It is also absolutely true that most of that 
money returns to the pockets of the donor agencies. 
 
But where are our industries, universities, public institutions, hospi-
tals, roads? Our civil wars have gone on for so long that they seem to 
be endemic, eternal, and insoluble. Somalia, a country which is almost 
mine because I’m culturally a Somali, has been totally disappeared as 
a state. Victim of the plethora of Somalian warlords. At the dark heart 
of African insecurity we find poverty, endemic and growing worse. 
We find greed. I am talking of the greed of the predators – the arms 
manufacturers and the oil guzzlers and the smugglers of people. Let 
me confess something heavy on my heart: having dealt with Somalia 
and having written a book on the Rwandan genocide (Moisson de 
crânes, Le Serpent à plumes, Paris, 2000), I would have occasionally 
pictured myself as an artist engagé but I must confess that I know 
nothing about the Darfour conflict. Experts discuss whether it could 
be designated as a genocide or not and there I am mute and ignorant. 
End of the parenthesis. From East to West of the continent, the situa-
tion is equally depressing. An average Nigerian, despite the oil boom, 
is now poorer than in 1970; the country is devastated by ethnic and 
religious disputes and remains one of the most corrupt places on earth; 
the justice system has all but collapsed; civil disorder and escapism 
are the norm and the once proud universities (Ibadan, the home of the 
first generation of daring Nigerian thinkers such as novelist Chinua 
Achebe or Ife where Wole Soyinka took his first position as a profes-
sor) have imploded. Nowadays, there is a joke tailored by my genera-
tion: ‘Do you work or do you teach ?’ is the question the potential 
mother-in-law asks you when you are introduced to her by your girl-
friend. Blague à part, the vast majority of developing countries have 
emerged recently from the womb of colonialism; both colonialism and 
globalization have in many ways fractured and distorted their cultural 
self-perceptions. Development will not occur without a reassertion of 
identity: that this is who we are, this is what we are proud of, this is 
what we want to be. In this process, culture and development are fun-
damentally linked and inter-dependent. The task of the writer is to find 
new ways (and revive old ones) of expressing his/her culture, just as 
his/her society strives, in the jungle of globalization, to find new ways 
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of being and becoming. In my latest novel, In the United States of Af-
rica (Jean-Claude Lattès edition, Paris, 2006), which is both a satire 
and a philosophical tale à la mode of Voltaire and Swift, I tried to re-
visit one of the most inspiring political ideas of the late fifties and six-
ties - Panafricanism – so that younger African generations know 
something about Kwame Nkrumah and Cheikh Anta Diop, Habib 
Bourguiba and Frantz Fanon, George Padmore and Haile Selassie. At 
the same time, I tried to put the world upside down. Africa has be-
come a hegemonic continent just as the USA or the European Union 
and consequently the USA and the EU are the worst countries on 
earth. I did not written the novel to take a kind of virtual revenge (the 
poor replacing the powerful and closing their frontiers to the white 
esterners, desperate young Portuguese or Italians disappearing into the 
Mediterranean Sea whereas young charming girls from Monaco or the 
Vatican find themselves trapped behind walls of prostitution in Al-
giers or Douala). What I tried to do is to picture the world from a dif-
ferent, perhaps new and refreshing, point of view. All in all, I would 
like the novel to be read as a philosophical tale addressing the present 
issues of inclusion and exclusion, migration and powerpolitics, race 
and otherness. It also is a pleasant story, I hope. As a writer committed 
to democracy, ethnic and religious pluralism and secularism, I see cul-
tural reassertion as a vital part of the enormous challenges confronting 
African countries – as vital as economic development. We are all fa-
miliar with the notion that "man does not live by bread alone". In Af-
rica, I would argue that music, dance, art and the telling of stories are 
indispensable to our ability to cope with that vital essential construct 
we call the human condition. After all, why does man need bread? To 
survive. But why survive, if it is only to indulge in more bread or 
more couscous? To live is more than just to sustain life – it is to en-
rich, and be enriched by life, by others be them strangers or 
neighbours, friends or foreigners. Our poorest men and women in Af-
rica and elsewhere in the developing world feel the throb of imagina-
tion on their pulse, that is why they continue telling stories to their 
children under the starlit skies. This brings me to Europe, the most il-
luminating continent in modern history. Europe has been the land of 
mass migration in the 19th century and till the middle of the 20th cen-
tury. The social phenomena at the origins of yesterday mass migration 
were not very different from the ones which drive nowadays millions 
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of African, Asian migrants to the lands of Europe. Migration and na-
tion are two connected entities, now in conflict, now in harmony. Are 
those leaving their homelands traitors or ambassadors? The relation-
ships between migrants and local authorities swing from laisser-faire 
to coercion, from negative perception to positive perception, from 
‘immigration subie’ to ‘immigration choisie’ if we use French recent 
taxinomy. These days, we experience the utterly negative side with its 
amount of fear, rejection and racism. The events of September 11th 
inaugurated a whole new set of challenges for Muslim immigrants. 
Life has become more difficult—not only for them but for their host 
societies, as well. And never in modern times has so much interna-
tional attention been focused on Muslims – their religion, their beliefs, 
their way of life. Yet, one might not forget the fact that migration has 
a history as long as humanity. It has always existed and it will con-
tinue to exist. The largest community in the world ignored by institu-
tions and statistics, a community with neither flag nor army, is the 
caste of "the other": of exiles, refugees, immigrants, displaced people, 
outsiders, outcasts, strangers, untouchables – and, of course, artists 
and writers (as different as Dante, Victor Hugo, Einstein, Kafka, 
Mann, Conrad, Benjamin, Arendt, Hikmet, Neruda, García Márquez, 
Rushdie or Soyinka). When I am optimistic I fancy that as a writer, as 
an African-European citizen with many loyalties and ties, as a man of 
this time and world, my task is to be open to others, the Other with a 
capital ‘O’, to the Beyond, to what I don’t know and what I assume to 
be different. I like to think the knowledge of the Other is the highest 
task to undertake, a task similar to the unveiling of what Emmanuel 
Levinas once called the ‘visage humain’. When one becomes aware 
that the tragedies of our time are all global in origin and reach, and 
that tackling them is a global responsibility, then half of the job has 
been done. Interdependence and living together are the key goals. 
 
2. The International Parliament of Writers 
Europe has in stock all the necessary conceptual and philosophical 
tools to tackle the issue of integration and togetherness. Just an exam-
ple, in 1993 a profoundly original institution, the International Parlia-
ment of Writers, was founded at Strasbourg. A cluster of famous writ-
ers, philosophers and opinion leaders (including Jacques Derrida, Pi-
erre Bourdieu, Edouard Glissant, Salman Rushdie, Vincenzo Consolo, 
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Russell Banks, José Saramago etc.) put together their energy and repu-
tation to rescue endangered writers throughout the globe. The protec-
tion of freedoms of expressions outlined in such documents as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (art. 19) and the charter of In-
ternational PEN, was the key goal. One of its originality was the tar-
get. The Parliament was not interested in dealing with the states or a 
group of states but with the cities, the municipalities or, even as in 
Paris with districts or local partners such as the Musée Pompidou. A 
year and a half later, the European Charter of Cities of Asylum by the 
Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe. The experi-
ence had many advantages. First, it proved much more efficient. Sec-
ondly, it discarded the national level and focused on more humane 
level. One of the Parliament’s references or source of inspiration was 
the medieval network of (European) cities and the notion of hospital-
ity vivid at those times (I am mentioning in passing here the notion of 
cosmopolitanism and hospitality revisited by Derrida – ‘On Cos-
mopolitanism and Forgiveness’, Autodafé, the review of the IPW). 
After twelve years of functioning, the Parliament, whose mission was 
temporary, was dissolved. Many writers of every corner of the globe 
were rescued and given a shelter. If the institution disappeared the 
idea is still alive in the USA, in Mexico and in Europe. The Interna-
tional Cities of Refuge Network (ICORN), located in Stavanger, Nor-
way, is one of the offsprings of the IPW. A brand new founding char-
ter was signed last year, in June 11, 2006. ‘The Municipality of Sta-
vanger is economically and legally responsible for the ICORN Ad-
ministration Centre. The aim of ICORN is to ‘work to advance a spirit 
of solidarity between individual writers and their host cities, among 
writers within the network, and among the participating cities and re-
gions of refuge’ (Founding Charter, Page 1). Needless to say, this 
amount of precious experiences, accumulated in the last fifteen years, 
should inspire European policy makers. It should help them to formu-
late and implement original and appropriate responses to other groups 
and situations. The North-South or transnational relationships are de-
fined by historical processes, by perceptions, and by power equations. 
Two components that appeal to me are ethics and power – more pre-
cisely, how non-power (or imagination) can be used as transformative 
agent. This brings me to the second part of my argument or my exam-
ple. It deals with the French language and its legacy and future. This 
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recent and highly political debate has been labelled ‘Le Manifeste des 
44’ by the medias. Le Manifeste des 44 44 French-language authors, 
including Tahar Ben Jelloun, Edouard Glissant, JMG Le Clézio, Amin 
Maalouf, Alain Mabanckou, Erik Orsenna, Maryse Conde and Michel 
Le Bris, signed a manifesto titled "Pour une 'littérature-monde' en 
français," which was published on the cover of Le Monde des Livres 
(March 16, 2007). I am one of the 4 writers of the manifesto with 
Alain Mabanckou, Michel Le Bris and Jean Rouaud. The idea 
emerged in Bamako, Mali, where a North-South artistic festival 
‘Etonnants Voyageurs Bamako’, has been taken place the last six 
years. Ideas and heated discussions take place there annually. The de-
sire to undertake something practical was expressed by a group of 
writers, some African or Francophone and some French. These writers 
wanted to implement a reconsideration of the literary aspect of "fran-
cophonie", in which France sees itself as the centre or the hub, while 
countries from the ex-empire are the spokes or the periphery. 
«Le centre, ce point depuis lequel était supposée rayonner une littéra-
ture franco-française, n'est plus le centre. Le centre jusqu'ici, même si 
de moins en moins, avait eu cette capacité d'absorption qui contrai-
gnait les auteurs venus d'ailleurs à se dépouiller de leurs bagages 
avant de se fondre dans le creuset de la langue et de son histoire na-
tionale : le centre, nous disent les prix d'automne, est désormais par-
tout, aux quatre coins du monde. Fin de la francophonie. Et naissance 
d'une littératuremonde en français ». 
Here is my rough translation: “The center, that point from which a 
Francophone-French literature was supposed to shine, is no longer the 
center. The center, up until now, had an absorption capacity that 
forced authors who came from somewhere else to give up their be-
longings before melting in the pot of the language and its national his-
tory. The center, the fall prizes tell us, is now everywhere, in the four 
corners of the world. End of francophonie. And birth of a world litera-
ture in French”. It has been largely noticed that this year, all the major 
French prizes (the Goncourt, the Grand Prix du roman de l'Académie 
française, the Renaudot and the Femina) were awarded to non-native 
French authors, and so it was perhaps an opportune time to raise the 
question of a "world literature in French," one that can live and thrive 
in the same way as world literature in English. Indeed, it is quite clear 
from the document that the authors look to the English-speaking world 
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as one in which it is easier for non-English writers to have their words 
heard, and their books considered for their merits. The authors write: 
«Combien d'écrivains de langue française, pris eux aussi entre deux 
ou plusieurs cultures, se sont interrogés alors sur cette étrange dispa-
rité qui les reléguait sur les marges, eux "francophones", variante 
exotique tout juste tolérée, tandis que les enfants de l'ex-empire bri-
tannique prenaient, en toute légitimité, possession des lettres anglai-
ses ? Fallait-il tenir pour acquis quelque dégénérescence congénitale 
des héritiers de l'empire colonial français, en comparaison de ceux de 
l'empire britannique ? Ou bien reconnaître que le problème tenait au 
milieu littéraire lui-même, à son étrange art poétique tournant comme 
un derviche tourneur sur lui-même, et à cette vision d'une francopho-
nie sur laquelle une France mère des arts, des armes et des lois conti-
nuait de dispenser ses lumières, en bienfaitrice universelle, soucieuse 
d'apporter la civilisation aux peuples vivant dans les ténèbres ?» 
And, in English: How many French-language writers, caught between 
two or several cultures, have asked themselves about this strange dis-
parity, which relegated them to the margins, as 'francophones', a 
barely tolerated exotic variant, while the children of the ex-British 
empire were taking, in all legitimacy, possession of English letters? 
Was one supposed to take for granted a certain congenital degenera-
tion among the heirs of the French colonial empire, by comparison 
with those of the British empire? Or else recognize that the problem 
was in the literary milieu itself, in its strange poetic art, turning like a 
dervish upon itself, and in this vision of a francophonie upon which a 
France, mother of letters, arms, and laws, continued to dispense its 
lights, as a universal benefactor, concerned with giving civilization to 
the peoples living in darkness? 
 
Even if things are not so rosy in the world of English-language litera-
ture, they are certainly rosier than in the francophone world. In any 
case, the manifesto drew a number of reactions. Abdou Diouf, expre-
sident of Senegal and now secretary-general of the International Or-
ganization of Francophonie denounced the 44 authors as "gravedig-
gers of francophonie." And in Le Figaro, presidential candidate Nico-
las Sarkozy, who never misses an opportunity to show his muscles, 
jumped into the debate, saying that "francophonie is not a colonial 
concept." One wonders, given his passionate defense, how many na-
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tive-born Frenchmen identify themselves as 'francophones.' We all 
know it is a term for the Blacks, the Browns, the migrants, The Oth-
ers. Often, Francophone writers of European origins (such Russian 
born Andrei Makine or Greek born Vassilis Alexakis) succeed in join-
ing the French literature category in bookshops, library, publishing 
collections or anthologies. On the other hand, French nationals by 
from the overseas (Glissant, Chamoiseau, Conde…), from the colonial 
empire are maintained into the Francophonie. The manifesto provokes 
an international coverage and a lively discussion is still going on the 
blogosphere. It is quite possible that the non-French world looks upon 
all of this with a mixture of sympathy and amusement. Some will 
think who cares about so silly labels (Francophone, French, Maghre-
bine, Negro-Africaine literature) while others will consider it as an 
obscure and sectarian debate. But, of course, I persist thinking that it 
is a very serious question considering the tight links between nation, 
citizenship and language in the history of France. In these times of 
identity revivalism (surenchère) and ambivalences, one of the aims of 
the manifesto is to reconsider the framework of the French model, to 
move from the French republic of letters to the “litterature monde” in 
French, this is of course a step forward before establishing the welt-
literatur, the paramount dream of Goethe. 
 
Conclusion 
The two examples show if need be that imagination is a transforma-
tive agent, it underlines the existence of groups and societies whose 
richness lies in their soul and not in their soil, whose past may offer 
more wealth than their present. Recognizing that this might be the 
case, and affirming that the imagination is as central to humanity's 
sense of its own worth as the ability to eat and drink and sleep under a 
roof, is part of the challenge. The IPW has shown us the way and the 
procedure. By renewing the true meaning of asylum. By welcoming 
persecuted immigrants. By removing borders. And by building decen-
tralised bridges. I believe Europeans will not become any less Euro-
pean if, in Mahatma Gandhi's metaphor, we open the doors and win-
dows of our continent and let foreign winds blow through our house. 
Diaspore writers have primarily brought broader political and cultural 
dimensions. They have vivified European literatures that were increas-
ingly neglecting the ambitions of their grand heritage. They 
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have enlarged the horizons of countries self-righteously clinging to 
their insularity and shown them the world at large, a world once colo-
nised. The enfants terribles of the UK, using the language of Shake-
speare and Derek Walcott, for instance, have brought new visions of 
truths, colours, depths, spectrums, insights, and compassion. They 
have brought new horizons. They have enriched us with neglected or 
ignored cultures. They have reignited in us such universal concepts as 
the struggle for love, liberty, equality, and universal welfare. They 
have reminded us that the differences between peoples are superficial, 
that irrespective of ethnicity, colour, or creed, we laugh or weep in the 
same way and for the same reasons. This is why, as a writer, I would 
argue that the specificities of literature are the best antidote to the 
globalization of the imagination. Literature teaches us to empathise, to 
look beyond the obvious. Let me finish with a last image, a last wink 
to a European philosopher, Slavoj Zizek. Some claim that the era of 
the European intellectual fighting for the preservation of the diversity 
of the human spirit is now behind us. They claim that ‘les intellectuels 
sont fatigués’, that Sartre or Gramsci, Bourdieu or Derrida are history, 
that the European intellectual is mute and distant and brooding just 
like the character in the famous painting of Durer called ‘Melancolia’. 
Slavoj Zizej reminds us with his usual passion that one the most pre-
cious legacy of Europe is the forging of a dream of better condition 
for mankind. 
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Selma Muhic Dizdarevic 
Europe and its Multinational Project of Integration: 
How to Succeed? (1) 
 
1. On the Situation of Migration and Integration in Central 
Europe 
 
As other European regions, and also as Europe as such, the region of 
Central Europe bares only a light reference to a geographical region, 
referring more to political definition of a certain area. In case of Cen-
tral Europe (CE), the use of the term can be ascribed as an achieve-
ment to the former President of the Czech Republic Václav Havel, 
who managed to replace the term Eastern Europe because the latter 
term invoked opposition between Western and Eastern Europe and did 
not go along well with the return of the Central European nations to 
“the European family” after the fall of communism. Therefore, the 
term refers to the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia, 
which have all recently joined the EU. 
 
In short, the given countries have undergone tremendous changes 
from the late nineties up to now, trying to reconstitute themselves and 
repair the damage to social fabric inflicted by communism. At the 
same time they started facing some of the problems characteristic of 
the “old” EU countries, which often had no solution to offer them-
selves. One of such problems is migration. Since I am supposed to 
characterize the nature of migration and integration flows in the CE 
region, I will have to neglect a lot of differences in the given countries 
and focus on just a few of many common patterns. 
 
First, let me focus on what did not happen as a pattern of integration: 
it was expected that post-communist societies of the region, which 
were so limited in terms of multiculturalism during communism 
would be more open and in a certain sense more compassionate with 
newly arriving migrants, partly because a lot of Central Europeans 
were migrants themselves or had a family member, who was a mi-
grant. However, this did not turn out to be true – levels of xenophobia 
were rising coupled with animosity for national minorities. State pol-
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icy response was rather slow and still leaves the impression of follow-
ing more or less by inertia EU requirements than looking for their own 
specific path, which would be prosperous and adequate for the given 
societies. We should not forget that still some of the CE nationals mi-
grate heavily into other EU states, such as Polish nationals to the UK 
or Ireland leaving a lot of blank spots on the local job markets and, 
thus, creating changes both in sending and receiving countries. 
 
If we speak more specifically about the types of migration into the CE 
countries, they tend to be the following: illegal or semi-legal transit 
migration, inflow of refugees, asylum seekers and temporary protected 
persons, multi-form short-term flows of labor within the region and 
from or to other regions, seasonal movements of migrant workers, 
immigration for settlement (including re-emigration), not to mention 
huge movements of the members of many ethnic groups following the 
collapse of the former Soviet Union, either between its former repub-
lics or to beyond its boundaries. Given the above mentioned fact that 
the countries have undergone several huge societal changes, such as 
reconstituting society including some basic institutions and instru-
ments destroyed by communist regime, changes of political and busi-
ness elites and relatively shortly afterwards accession to the EU, re-
sponse to these migration flows tended to be and still to a certain de-
gree remains somewhat unsystematic. Still, the levels of migration in-
flux are much lower than in almost all old EU countries, which gives 
hope that some of the mistakes made by the old EU societies will not 
be repeated by the new EU countries. However, since classical ex-
periments in social sciences are not possible, it remains to be observed 
how the future cooperation will look like. 
 
 
2. How to Succeed? 
 
Process of integration in European Union countries has two develop-
ing and somewhat separated sides: one is integration of the EU coun-
tries as such, including integration of new accession (and regularly ac-
ceding countries), the other is a far more visible and contested integra-
tion of newcomers, immigrants and refugees, i.e. groups of so-called 
new minorities. From the social point of view, this is a very challeng-
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ing and hard to manage complicated range of problems because simul-
taneously the EU is constituting itself and absorbing newcomers from 
cultures and countries with very often quite different historical and po-
litical backgrounds. This requires quite an effort on the part of the 
European society, its institutions, policies, but also its citizens. 
 
If we want to answer the question how to succeed in managing multi-
cultural Europe bearing in mind the goal of integration, we have to ask 
the question: did we fail, and if so, where ? Do information and data 
warning us of failure of integration and multiculturalism, which we 
get from media and encounter in everyday life, signal that, although 
various policies were applied across Europe and although Europe has 
been and still is an attractive migration destination, this project of 
multicultural integration, understood as peaceful coexistence of cul-
tures in one political community, European societies managed to pro-
duce an underclass consisting of immigrants and their descendants? 
My answer to this is: failure was not on the part of multicultural poli-
cies (although there are opinions that multiculturalism is European 
weakness, coming from bad colonial conscience), because there has 
been no single policy and there has not been a single isolated area 
where multiculturalism has been applied. What failed in my opinion 
was civic education and political emancipation in the aspect of coexis-
tence of various groups as well as enhancing responsibilities, which 
the status of citizen entails, not stressing only rights and liberties. 
 
The other important aspect, which seriously affected “the European 
multicultural project”, was the crisis of the European welfare state and 
the overall discussions on neo-liberalism approach vs. the social assis-
tance state. Many critics pointed at some of the dangerous disadvan-
tages of the welfare state concept - that is paternalism on the one side 
and complementary dependence and overall passiveness of the citi-
zens on the other. This affected integration even more so with new-
comers as a class of inhabitants being more vulnerable to social strati-
fication. Welfare rights were not considered enough in its culturally 
conditioned aspect and consequences for integration. Instead, they 
sometimes provided means for hostile isolation, which created an at-
mosphere and channels for terrorist actions, which shocked our socie-
ties. 
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And finally, I think that Europe should revise its concept of humani-
tarian migration, which currently is a source of tremendous chaos in 
all aspects of the European asylum policy and consequently for inte-
gration issues. The EU should make clear whether it can support the 
asylum concept and set conditions for integration of successful asylum 
applicants or revise the concept and restrict the number of humanitar-
ian AND increase the number of commercial migration. The EU still 
has no efficient policy of skilled labor migration. 
 
In sum, the answer how to succeed, provided we agree on what suc-
cess means is: increase civic education stressing obligations for all, 
make political participation more inclusive, reduce welfare state ef-
fects where they produce isolation and passiveness, revise and rede-
fine asylum policy and set clear and attractive conditions for skilled 
labor migration. In the reasonable time horizon, these will be some of 
the most pressing European tasks. 
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Kenan Malik 
Europe and its Multinational Project of Integration: 
How to Succeed? (2) 
 
The debate about the nature of integration has, over the past half cen-
tury, generally taken the form of a debate between assimilationists and 
multiculturalists. Assimilationists argue that equality requires that 
every individual has to be treated as a citizen, not as a member of a 
particular racial or cultural group. Used as a criterion for allocating 
resources or opportunities, racial or ethnic categorisation inevitably 
confers advantages on members of some groups and disadvantages on 
members of others and hence helps perpetuate social antagonisms. 
Multiculturalists retort that the assimilationist idea of a neutral public 
space and of colour-blind public policies is a myth. Racial discrimina-
tion is a fact and without taking into account the reality of racial and 
cultural differences it is possible to combat it. One of the ironies of 
this debate is that the quarrel between assimilationists and multicul-
turalists has become particularly acute in recent years less because 
both sides are confident of their arguments than because both have 
developed deep misgivings. Both appear perplexed by the problem of 
how to manage a diverse society while maintaining a sense of com-
mon identity. Both the debate, and the misgivings, were brought into 
sharp focus in the autumn of 2005, when France and Britain were al-
most simultaneously rocked by riots. In France, nationwide riots set 
mainly, but not entirely, North African youth against the police. In 
Britain, Lozells in Birmingham saw a weekend of street violence be-
tween Asians and African Caribbeans, which left one man dead and 
relations between the two communities deeply fractured. What I want 
to do is repose the debate. Part of the problem is that both sides in this 
debate confuse the idea of a diversity of peoples and a diversity of 
values. On the one side, many argue that the presence in a society of 
diversity of peoples precludes the possibility of common values. 
Hence the need for differential public policy, to treat different groups 
differently. On the other side, many suggest that the diversity of peo-
ples generated by mass immigration inevitably undermines social co-
hesion. Hence the need to clamp down on immigration and to reduce 
the level of diversity. Both arguments are wrong. It is facile to suggest 
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that society can run on diversity alone. Every society needs a common 
set of values to function properly, a vision of what kind of society it is. 
Of course, in every society values are contested, and there are radi-
cally different visions of the ideal society. Such conflict is not new, 
nor the product of immigration. Conflict between different value sys-
tems is part of a healthy democratic process necessary to mould the 
political and cultural shape of a society. What doesn’t work is a lais-
sez-faire attitude to values, whereby values are deemed to be incom-
mensurate and a society is defined simply in terms of its willingness to 
tolerate differences. It is equally facile to try to pin the blame for the 
erosion of common values on immigrants. Take for instance the com-
mon fear that Islamic values are incompatible with the tenets of liberal 
democracy and that the growth of the Muslim community will under-
mine cohesion and transform basic secular values. The trouble is there 
is no such thing as the Muslim community nor a single set of Islamic 
values. Muslim communities are as riven by difference and division as 
any other community – especially divisions of class, gender and na-
tionality. Today ‘radical’ in the Islamic context means religiously fun-
damentalist. When I was growing up in the 1980s it meant the very 
opposite – to be radical in Muslim communities was to be secular. 
Today the idea of a secular Muslim seems almost an oxymoron, but 
twenty years ago there were very strong and vibrant secular move-
ments and organisations. The fact that they have disappeared and the 
Muslim community has come to be defined largely in religious terms, 
and its values defined largely in opposition to western liberal values, 
is not something intrinsic to Islam or to Muslim communities, but a 
product of both social developments and public policy that have 
shaped the character of those communities. The real problem is not so 
much that immigrants can’t imbibe the values of liberal democracy, 
but that within many Western nations the sense of what those values 
are have been eroded, as has the sense of what kind of society they are 
or want to be. As a result people have begun to view themselves and 
their social affiliations in a different way. Social solidarity has become 
increasingly defined not in political terms - as collective action in pur-
suit of certain political ideals – but in terms of ethnicity, culture or 
faith. The question people ask themselves is not so much ‘What kind 
of society do I want to live in?’ as ‘Who are we?’. The first question 
looks forward for answers and defines them in terms of the common-
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ality of values necessary for establishing the good life. The second one 
generally looks back and seeks answers – and defines identity – in 
terms of history and heritage. The politics of ideology, in other words, 
has given way to the politics of identity. One of the enduring myths 
about immigration and integration is that the political classes have ac-
quiesced to multicultural policies because minority groups have de-
manded that their cultural differences be recognised and be afforded 
respect. This is not the case, even in Britain where such policies have 
been taken furthest in Europe. Historically, postwar immigrants, in-
cluding Muslims, were concerned less with preserving their cultural 
differences than in achieving political equality. Certainly, there was 
alienation and anger because of the degree of racism encountered. But 
the goal was always to gain equal political rights. Only over the past 
two decades have immigrant groups sought to assert their cultural dif-
ference. Why? Because they have been encouraged to do so by socie-
ties that celebrate the idea that different communities should pursue 
their own cultural values and interests. Immigration, in other words, 
has not caused the fraying of a common set of values. Rather multicul-
turalism is itself the product of such frayed values. Multiculturalism 
was the official response to the identity crisis within Western socie-
ties, an attempt to provide a positive sheen to this crisis, representing 
the lack of common identity as a new cultural pluralism, and the 
fragmentation of communities as an enriching kind of diversity. Ac-
companying this confusion between the idea of a diversity of peoples 
and a diversity of values is another confusion: between diversity as 
lived experience and multiculturalism as a political process. As lived 
experience, diversity is positive. Thanks to mass immigration Western 
Europe is less insular, less homogenous, more vibrant and cosmopoli-
tan than it was half a century ago, and this is much better for it. Those 
who advocate multiculturalism as a political process are, however, 
talking about something different. Multiculturalism, they argue, re-
quires the public recognition and affirmation of cultural differences. 
An individual’s cultural background frames their identity and helps 
define who they are. If we want to treat individuals with dignity and 
respect we must also treat with dignity and respect the groups who 
furnish them with their sense of personal being. Social justice, they 
argue, requires not just that individuals are treated as political equals, 
but that their cultural beliefs are also treated as equally valid; that dif-
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ferent cultural beliefs are affirmed, recognised, and indeed institution-
alised, in the public sphere. Ironically, the impact of multicultural 
policies has been to undermine diversity as lived experience. As lived 
experience, diversity is an argument for open borders and open minds. 
The consequences of multiculturalism as a political project is, how-
ever, to seal people into ethnic boxes and to police the boundaries. A 
good illustration of this came in a public argument broke out last year 
in Britain between Tony Blair and Britain's Muslim leaders about the 
lack of progress in combating home-grown terrorism. Muslims ac-
cused the government of ignoring their advice about how best to deal 
with extremists. The real problem, the prime minister responded, was 
that moderate Muslims had not done enough to root out extremists 
within their own communities. The starting point for both sides was 
the belief that Muslims constitute a community with a distinct set of 
views and beliefs, and that mainstream politicians are incapable of 
reaching out to them. So there had to be a bargain between the gov-
ernment and the Muslim community. The government acknowledged 
Muslim leaders as crucial partners in the task of defeating terrorism 
and building a fairer society. In return, Muslim leaders agreed to keep 
their own house in order. The argument was about who was, or was 
not, keeping their side of the bargain. The trouble is, the bargain itself 
is the problem. For what it shows is that the government abandoned its 
responsibility for engaging directly with its citizens who happen to be 
Muslim. Instead, it has effectively subcontracted its responsibilities to 
so-called community leaders. Rather than appealing to Muslims as 
British citizens, and attempting to draw them into the mainstream po-
litical process, today politicians of all hues prefer to see them as peo-
ple whose primarily loyalty is to their faith and who can be politically 
engaged only by other Muslims. The consequences of this approach 
are hugely damaging. ‘Why', as Amartya Sen asked in his book Iden-
tity and Violence, ‘should a British citizen who happens to be Muslim 
have to rely on clerics and other leaders of the religious community to 
communicate with the prime minister of the country?’ Far from pro-
moting any sense of integration, such multicultural policies encour-
ages Muslims – and other minorities - to see themselves as semi-
detached Britons. After all, is it surprising that if mainstream politi-
cians abdicate their responsibility for engaging with ordinary Mus-
lims, that those Muslims should feel disenchanted with the main-
 41
stream political process? But the insistence that individuals everyone 
as citizens, not as bearers of specific racial or cultural histories, that 
they should not be treated differently because of their racial and cul-
tural identities does not mean that discrimination against particular 
groups should be ignored. We should not confuse ‘colour blindness’ 
and ‘racism blindness’. This is exactly what is happening in France. 
Assimilationism in France has come to mean not ignoring differences, 
but pointing up differences to suggest why certain groups – in particu-
lar Muslims - cannot be French. The policy of corralling hundreds of 
thousands of the poor and disadvantaged into sink estates. 
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Paul Scheffer 
The Land of Arrival: 
How Migration Is Changing Europe 
 
Migrants from every corner of the world have changed urban commu-
nities in Europe. Whatever their original intention, whatever ours, it 
has long since ceased to matter. The world has nestled into our 
neighbourhoods, a confusing and shocking experience. Shops, places 
of worship, schools and markets - everything and everybody is af-
fected by the mass migration currently underway, the end of which is 
by no means in sight. Indeed, one gets the impression that the great 
mobility of people characterizes a new era that, in the absence of bet-
ter words, we describe as an era of globalization. 
 
We would be ill-advised to belittle or disregard these profound 
changes. The bromide “immigration is a timeless phenomenon” is 
therefore wasted on me. How often one comes across such extenuat-
ing phrases in official publications. The Municipality of Amsterdam 
writes, as if it were a routine statement, “Almost half of those living in 
Amsterdam do not originally come from the Netherlands. That is 
nothing new. As an immigration city, for centuries Amsterdam has 
welcomed people from different extractions and denominations: Por-
tuguese Jews, French Huguenots and migrant workers from Ger-
many”. In other words, people have always been on the move, and 
these times are therefore unexceptional. 
 
But the old and new migrations differ considerably. Even if, according 
to historical criteria, there might be nothing new under the sun, we are 
nevertheless witnessing a radical shift in the composition of the popu-
lation. The seventeenth century was, indeed, full of movement, but 
that does nothing to detract from the upheaval in big cities today. How 
can immigrant workers from Morocco or Turkey, who are changing 
our cities, possibly be cancelled out by the migrant workers from 
Germany who once arrived in these parts? It may be that Jews from 
Portugal fled this way to escape the Inquisition, but that does not 
mean that the arrival of refugees from Iran or Afghanistan, fleeing the 
religious tyranny of Islam, has simply become a matter of course. 
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A History of Alienation 
 
How long can the significance of what happens to you be diminished 
by referring to the vicissitudes of the past? How long can a major ex-
perience be denied and dismissed as outside the norm? Not so very 
long, as the sense of losing something essential is intrusive and will 
not easily be stilled. What can no longer be ignored is that tolerance 
and freedom are under pressure. Not only in the Netherlands, but also 
in surrounding countries. This growing unease demands expression. 
 
The migration we are now experiencing has so far failed to make our 
society more open. If we look at the traditional views many migrants 
bring with them, it would be more accurate to say that old issues re-
garding women's position have suddenly re-emerged and that freedom 
of speech is once again contested. Even though these views are some-
times familiar from our own past, it can hardly been seen as progress 
to be forced to repeat the emancipation that took place fifty years ago. 
The immigration of closed communities is putting the open society to 
the test. 
 
Unfortunately, the receiving societies in Europe are facing that test 
with utmost insecurity. In countries such as Austria, France, Italy, 
Denmark, the Netherlands and Belgium, the success of populist par-
ties is the visible sign of a buried unease. The mounting tension is tan-
gible, as is the tendency to turn away from a threatening outside 
world. 
 
It is uncertain, to say the least, whether the past few decades’ migra-
tion constitutes an enrichment of society. In fact, repetitive use of that 
word is ill-chosen in view of the impoverished circumstances in which 
many migrants live. Their lack of education, in numerous cases their 
illiteracy, adds little to societies that are suddenly faced with the sum 
of these deprivations. In several European countries, the costs of mi-
gration are, for the time being, higher than its benefits. 
 
This is not a question of guilt. Certainly many migrants could have 
done more to gain a place in their new country, and they should have 
rid themselves more quickly of the myth of return, the idea that their 
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stay in Europe was only temporary. But the receiving societies have 
failed to fully comprehend that migration and the welfare state do not 
automatically mix. Plentiful facilities of social support have reasona-
bly provided for many immigrants, but at the same time, have placed 
them in a situation of hopeless dependence. 
 
In retrospect, all sides have made errors in evaluation. But that does 
not sum it up, by any means. It remains to be seen how a renewal of 
society as a whole can emerge from this clash. Today’s impasse can 
be overcome: That belief is the driving force in the current search for 
a new vocabulary and fresh insight. If we succeed in that search, then 
we will justifiably be able to say that the arrival of so many migrants 
has, indeed, made society more open, while enriching it in numerous 
ways. 
 
What we need is a more open-minded view of the frictions and clashes 
characteristic of any mass migration process. Many current research-
ers are rather restrained in their opinions, but luckily we can fall back 
on earlier generations of historians and sociologists who have studied 
migration. Oscar Handlin, for example, the most famous historian of 
immigration to America, wrote in a time when the moralization of mi-
gration was not yet a major issue and the conflict between newcomers 
and natives was not yet expressed in terms of good and bad. 
 
In The Uprooted: The Epic Story of the Great Migrations That Made 
the American People, a book that won Handlin the Pulitzer Prize, he 
identified the causes and consequences of the migration of the large 
numbers of people who crossed the Atlantic from Europe to America. 
His story can be summarized in one phrase, the theme of everything 
that follows here: “The history of migration is the history of alienation 
and its consequences”. Alienation and loss, those are the key concepts 
describing the arrival of migrants in a new environment. 
 
Handlin first considers those who came to America - the migrants and 
their uprooting. Tens of millions were cast adrift by the consequences 
of industrialization and the enormous population explosion in the sec-
ond half of the century. The disruption and poverty it caused in the 
countryside, in particular, translated into mass immigration from 
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countries such as Ireland, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Norway and Po-
land. 
 
With great empathy, Handlin describes the often-horrifying ocean 
voyage and arrival in the new land. Once there, the migrants had to 
find their way, more than once entirely destitute and without any idea 
of what awaited them: 
A time came for many men when the slow glacial shift of economic 
and social forces suddenly broke loose in some major upheaval that 
cast loose the human beings from their age-old setting. In an extreme 
form this was the experience of the immigrants. It was also in some 
degree the experience of all modern men. They did not welcome the 
liberation, almost any of them. Its immediate form was always separa-
tion22
                                                
  
 
Migration was, and is, primarily a tale of town and country; in addi-
tion to craftsmen, it was mostly farmers who sought refuge in Amer-
ica. Handlin describes their loss of status on arrival: “The loyal dutiful 
man, faithful to tradition, the man who was the son and grandson of 
substantial peasants, was reduced to the indignity of hired labour, 
while shrewd, selfish, unscrupulous upstarts thrived”. Family life, in 
particular, was affected; the old extended families slowly disinte-
grated, old skills suddenly proved unprofitable. “Loneliness, separa-
tion from the community of the village, and despair at the insignifi-
cance of their own human abilities, these were the elements that, in 
America, colored the peasants' view of their world”. 
 
In these strange circumstances, many reverted to the security of tradi-
tion, particularly religious tradition: “In that sense all immigrants were 
conservatives, dissenters and peasants alike. All would seek to set 
their ideas within the fortifications of religious and cultural institu-
tions that would keep them sound against the strange New World”. 
What concerns me most is that conservatism - reverting back to old 
customs and habits in order to survive in an entirely new, often urban 
 
22  Oscar Handlin, The Uprooted: The Epic Story of the Great Migrations That 
Made the American People (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1952), p. 
305. 
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environment. The final result was often a feeling of no longer belong-
ing anywhere, concluded Handlin: “They had thus completed their 
alienation from the culture to which they had come, as from that 
which they had left”. That no-man's land also typifies the experience 
of many contemporary migrants, who seek handholds in a new soci-
ety, but fail to find them. 
 
It is not only the migrants who suffer from disorientation, but also 
those who already live in the land of arrival. After all, that land was 
not a blank canvas, but a country with a history of customs and habits, 
laws and institutions. The non-immigrant population, too, is thrown 
off balance and must try to regain its equilibrium. Handlin sees that 
side of the story all too well: 
Everything in the neighbourhood was so nice, they would later say, 
until the others came. The others brought outlandish ways and unin-
telligible speech, foreign dress and curious foods, were poor, worked 
hard, and paid higher rents for inferior quarters.3 3
                                                
 
Harking back to a certain view of the community as it was before eve-
rything changed is an understandable reaction: “We want our country 
back”, or even stronger, “We want our goddamn future back”, as 
someone said recently in an English television programme. Not only 
do we see that resistance throughout the entire history of American 
immigration; naturally we are all too familiar with it in our own time 
and place. The feeling among the natives that something of a familiar 
society is being lost should be acknowledged, just as we acknowledge 
the uprooted feelings of many newcomers.  
 
The phrase “We've become strangers in our own country” should 
therefore not be dismissed out of hand as an expression by the com-
mon man, unaware that the world has changed. On the contrary, this 
loaded sentence acknowledges that migration has brought the whole 
world into the neighbourhood. 
 
No wonder, therefore, that newcomers and natives share the same 
feeling of loss, for the cause of their restlessness is the same. First of 
 
33  Ibid, p. 189. 
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all, naturally, migrants embody a world adrift but, partly due to their 
arrival, the natives are being swept along with these changes in their 
daily environment. As Handlin says, it is the shared condition of mod-
ern people. Everyone is undergoing a disorienting experience. Indeed: 
“The history of migration is the history of alienation and its conse-
quences”. 
 
That also explains why this shared feeling of loss leads not to sponta-
neous rapprochement, but rather to a separation between newcomers 
and natives. The seclusion now in motion among both the minority 
and the majority is part of the history of immigration and also a reac-
tion to a new phase of globalization. The literary critic Svetlana Boym 
illustrates that well, writing, “Nostalgia is paradoxical in the sense that 
longing can make us more empathetic toward fellow humans, yet the 
moment we try to repair longing with belonging, the apprehension of 
loss with a rediscovery of identity, we often part ways and put an end 
to mutual understanding”44
                                                
 That is exactly what is happening now: The 
longing to find a handhold in a turbulent world drives newcomers and 
natives apart. That is what I described several years ago, to the dismay 
of many, as a “multicultural drama”. 
 
The rediscovery of identity has nothing to do with irrationality. It is a 
defence mechanism, for both majorities and minorities, which we 
need to understand. There is a risk of people entrenching themselves 
in a sense of loyalty to their own community. Self-images under pres-
sure become ossified, while everyone knows you can only develop in 
constant interchange with an ever-changing environment. We must 
reach past nostalgia and internalize the fact that migration is changing 
our societies irreversibly. 
 
 
Conflict in Migrant Families 
 
Migration generally stems from necessity, but the talent to make a vir-
tue of that necessity is not given to everyone. Too often we see the 
romanticized image of the immigrant as the embodiment of a world 
 
44  Svetlana Boym, The Future of Nostalgia (NewYork: Basic Books, 2001), p. xv. 
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increasingly in motion. The migrant is described as a forerunner, a 
kind of reluctant advance guard. An experience that usually has trau-
matic aspects has been translated into an added value. There are many 
examples of that attempt to turn a necessity into a virtue. Some writ-
ers, entrepreneurs, sports heroes and politicians succeed in acquiring 
prominent positions in their new countries. There are also innumerable 
teachers, shopkeepers, policemen and nurses who have made a suc-
cess of migration, but it doesn't always come easy. 
 
Keeping your balance on the slack rope strung between the land of 
origin and the land of arrival demands immense effort. Not many are 
blessed with the ability to master that difficult balancing act. Often, 
the temptation is great either to break with everything left behind or to 
cling to memories and resist the new environment. In any event, the 
loss cannot be denied, even if the added value of migration is empha-
sized. 
 
It does not help to relativize the effort of migrating. Despite the suc-
cessful efforts of many to drag themselves out of the quagmire, we 
should not forget that the effort all too often begins in a quagmire. 
Migration has been referred to as a brutal bargain: You lose something 
precious and, at the same time, gain access to another culture. In other 
words, acquiring a place in a new country often means compromising, 
or even betraying, family traditions. Learning a new language es-
tranges many migrants little by little from their parental homes. That 
struggle between the culture of the land of origin and the land of arri-
val embroils many migrant families. 
 
This social reality carries more weight than do abstract models of in-
tegration. In countries such as Great Britain and France, much empha-
sis is placed on the individual traditions of integration; the migration 
experience and consequent ethnic tensions in the two countries, and 
elsewhere in Europe, however, are reasonably comparable. We must 
look beyond the discussion of models, which functions as a way of 
immunizing countries against experiences over the border (“the crisis 
of the French model” or “the failure of the Dutch model”, means, in 
other words, “it’s not a British problem”). Then we discover that the 
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experiences of migrants and natives in Bradford, Lyon, Malmö, Rot-
terdam and Antwerp are not all that different. 
 
Let us look more closely at the degree to which relocation is an up-
rooting experience. There is nothing harmonious or easy about this 
experience, certainly in view of many migrants' rural backgrounds. 
Imagine the voyage in time, from a small village community in the Rif 
Mountains or Anatolia to the teeming urban environment of Amster-
dam, Birmingham, Lyon or Frankfurt. The saying in the Morocco is: 
“going to the airport on a donkey”. It is not surprising that all kinds of 
confrontations arise in this situation; it would be more likely to raise 
questions if there were none. 
 
Had we known our classics, we would have been able to anticipate the 
problems immigration provokes. Read what the founder of the famous 
Chicago School of sociology, Robert E. Park, wrote as far back as 
1925 on the basis of his observations in Chicago’s migrant milieu, in 
the ghettos that developed so spectacularly there. The fact that Little 
Italy was also referred to as “Little Hell”, with fifteen thousand un-
educated farmers from Sicily and their families packed together in 
wretched conditions, leaves little to the imagination. 
 
Migrants’ lives are marked not only by poverty, but also by a difficult 
cultural transition, Park wrote in the 1920s: “We are living in such a 
period of individualization and social disorganization. Society is, ap-
parently, not much more than a congeries and constellation of social 
atoms”. In such an individualized society, it is hard for community-
based migrants to find their way:  
Energies that were formerly controlled by custom and tradition are 
released. The individual is free for new adventures, but he is more or 
less without direction and control. The result is a cultural hybrid, a 
man on the margin of two cultures and two societies, which are never 
completely interpenetrated and fused.55
                                                
  
 
 
55  Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, The City: Suggestions for Investigation 
of Human Behavior in the Urban Environment (Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press, 1984), p. 107. 
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Even at the beginning of the last century it was recognized that the 
main issue was the clash between individualization and community 
spirit. 
 
Disorientation in a society where so many rural people find them-
selves in an urban environment is therefore not surprising; it can be 
seen in the lands of origin. Migrants from the Moroccan and Turkish 
countryside already have difficulty adjusting in Casablanca and Istan-
bul. The culture shock is even more severe when, on top of this diffi-
cult transition in their own country from a village community to an 
anonymous city, they also must transition from a religious culture to 
an overwhelmingly secular society. In fact, two steps are taken in one 
journey, making the transition from tradition to modernity very abrupt 
indeed. 
 
This unsettling quest can be found in numerous places, but first within 
the family, where the distance from and proximity to the new society 
are felt most strongly. Farah Karimi, a Dutch member of parliament 
originally from Iran, wrote, “There is certainly a multicultural drama 
being played out here. In the living rooms of minority families, in par-
ticular”.66
                                                
 This is a fierce conflict between traditional and modern 
views of relations between men and women, parents and children, be-
lievers and nonbelievers. 
 
For those involved, much is at stake: It is more than a question of give 
and take. A compromise is not easy between one culture based on des-
tiny and another that tries to give priority to individual freedom. In the 
first case, everything is virtually predetermined: The social position, 
caste, faith and gender into which you are born is the mould into 
which the rest of your life is poured. There is virtually no chance of 
escape. In the other culture, life is seen as an invitation to self-
development. The idea that you must take “fate” into your own hands 
also leads to high, even excessive expectations, but the point of depar-
ture is quite different from that of a traditional culture, which places 
all emphasis on community, leaving little or no room for the individ-
ual. 
 
66  Farah Karimi, quoted in a Dutch newspaper article. 
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The distorted relationship of migrant parents and their children is one 
of the most painful consequences of migration, as the relative isolation 
of many increases their alienation from sons and daughters, who are 
neither willing nor able to keep such distance from the society they 
live in daily. There is nothing strange or unexpected about a genera-
tional conflict, but in many migrant families the distance between the 
generations is extreme. Many parents miss the opportunity to prepare 
their children for life in a society where they are unfamiliar with not 
only the language but also the customs and habits. Their resignation is 
all too visible, the feeling that everything has been taken away from 
them. 
 
In his novel Judith and Jamal, Fouad Laroui typifies the father and 
son relationship: “Abal-Khail loved his son, but did not know how to 
put it into words. He was concerned for him, there in that country of 
which he understood so little. It was his fault that Jamal was growing 
up in that land of infidels. He had wanted to protect him from all dan-
gers, against the temptations, the pitfalls”. The mother is, if possible, 
even further removed from her surroundings. Is it possible to live 
somewhere and yet not be there, Laroui wonders? 
 
Years later that question was answered when I saw Mina lying asleep 
one day on a couch, worn out. The answer is a tragic yes. Early in the 
morning, swathed in an outlandish jellaba, she hurries through the 
streets of Paris, but what is she actually making of her life? Every-
where, she is excluded, irrevocably excluded….7 7
                                                
 
The parents’ impotence is painfully obvious. As someone said, “It's 
not that they don't want to give us any support; they just can't. You 
can't give away something you haven't got”. Many immigrant parents 
are so distanced from the surrounding society that they know nothing 
about their children’s life outside the house. The children grow up in 
separate worlds: at home, at school and on the street. The norms that 
prevail at home have little to do with those in the world outside. For 
many parents and children, the distances that must be bridged day af-
ter day are simply too great. 
 
77  Fouad Laroui, Judith en Jamal (Amsterdam: Van Oorschot, 2001), p. 63. 
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The frequent arranged marriages betray a clear view of the role of 
women, a view that increasingly conflicts with a society that has just 
seen forty years of emancipation. Fatima, a Moroccan student, had 
this to say, “Like my father, my mother thinks I should stop studying 
and ought to get on and get married. Education is not that important in 
our family. As a woman, you don't have much use for an education; 
after all, you're going to get married and become a housewife, so 
working for qualifications is a waste of time”. Cultural preferences 
thus have far-reaching social consequences, a connection that, for 
many years, has been rather frenetically denied. 
 
The families of Caribbean migrants from Jamaica or Surinam - who 
differ in many respects from Muslim families from Morocco and Tur-
key - also suffer a generation gap. The parents try to remain as invisi-
ble as possible, while the children stand up for themselves far more. 
Mike and Trevor Phillips illustrate that beautifully in their oral history 
of these migrants and their children, who make themselves more felt 
in British society:  
The experience opened up a gap between the generations which was 
all the more disturbing because it was so unfamiliar within the cul-
tures from which the migrants came, but it was the experience which 
was to define the future of the Caribbean migrant community.8 8
                                                
 
The problem is not only the cultural divide between the generations; it 
is also the transfer of deprivation in education. If you look at the chil-
dren of migrant families, the so-called second generation, it is imme-
diately striking that the often-explicit expectations of a rapid rise in 
society have, in many cases, not been realized. The whole idea that 
integration is only a question of time and that we should patiently 
await the generational change turns out, on closer examination, to be 
facile. The statistics for education, work and crime speak for them-
selves. The overrepresentation of children from migrant families at the 
bottom of the social ladder is unmistakable. 
 
 
88  Mike Phillips and Trevor Phillips, Windrush: The Irresistible Rise of Multi-
racial Britain (London: Harper Collins, 1998), p. 203. 
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This has raised a new social issue. Although the differences between 
and within ethnic groups are considerable, the general situation seems 
troubling. On average, children from migrant families have an appre-
ciable disadvantage in cognitive development and language skills, bar-
ring them from the better jobs. According to researchers, there is a 
“considerable talent reserve”.99
                                                
 Yet the gap between native and immi-
grant children remains great. 
 
It should be clearly stated that there is, on the other hand, a growing 
middle class of migrants and their children. Innumerable successful 
migrants have acquired an intrinsic stake in our societies. That is im-
portant as, although they feel an affinity with their land of origin, their 
identification with the land of arrival is marked. Also, the place they 
can attain in society determines the degree to which they see this land 
as their own. A society that offers talented migrants too little opportu-
nity will pay a high price. 
 
We are seeing a polarization within migrant communities between 
those who are doing well and the considerable group that is not. Half 
the Turkish and Moroccan children in a country like the Netherlands 
may leave school with insufficient qualifications, but between one 
quarter and one third of the children from these families do quite well 
at school. It has long been impossible to lump the life path of children 
from these families under the common denominator of “deprivation”. 
And that is hopeful. What remains is the large group that has failed in 
the current educational system and has little chance in the labour mar-
ket. What will happen to them in our cities? What will their lives be 
like, what outlet will their frustration find in an environment of seem-
ingly unlimited opportunities? The tensions they will cause cannot be 
cancelled out by the success stories, although these exist, and should 
be told. 
 
 
99  Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau (SCP), Rapportage minderheden 1999. Positie 
in het onderwijs en op de arbeidsmarkt (Den Haag, 1999), p. 99. 
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Old and New Migrations 
 
Much of the current immigration can be understood in the light of his-
tory. Here and now in the big cities of Europe, we face many of the 
problems Polish or Italian immigrants experienced in early- twentieth-
century America. The distance between parents and children is classic. 
Moreover, most of those early-wave migrants were fairly poor, with 
little education when they began their journey. Finally, there is noth-
ing new about migrants attributing special significance to their faith; 
how often have they prioritized the rebuilding of their places of wor-
ship in the land of arrival, in order to retain something from their land 
of origin? In a certain sense, today’s migrants are simply repeating an 
old exercise. 
 
Could it then be true that there is nothing new in today’s migration? 
No, the old and the new migrations have plenty in common, but there 
are also substantial differences. Something new is really afoot. Relig-
ion has always played a major role in the migration process, but Islam 
is an entirely new phenomenon in the Western world. And not only 
here, but also in the history of Islam itself: The presence of Muslim 
minorities in a liberal, secular society is unique. The fact that, before 
too long, some 20 million Muslims will be living in the countries of 
the European Union and soon, perhaps, after Turkey joins the Union, 
even more, is a challenge in every respect. Not only for religious Mus-
lims, but also for the receiving societies that seek a way to deal with a 
religion that, until now, has always been in a majority. It does not help 
that, since 11 September, Islam has become so controversial in the 
West. 
 
Religion, culture and politics are woven into the tradition of Islam, 
certainly where it is predominant, as in the Arabic world. In a modern 
society, however, those domains are separated. The image of cohesion 
is highly distorted here, which the fundamentalist Muslim thinker 
Sayyid Qutb referred to as “the hideous schizophrenia of modern 
life”.1010
                                                
 Serious obstacles must be overcome if we are to achieve a 
 
11 00  Quoted in Paul Berman, Terror and Liberalism (New York: W.W. Norton, 
2003), p.75 . 
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more or less natural integration of Islam and if religion is, indeed, to 
be emancipated from the culture of the land of origin, even if only to 
prevent specific customs and traditions acquiring a sacred aura. It is 
not about a departure from Islam as a spiritual tradition, but a question 
of how to live as a religious minority in a democratic environment. 
Too often the mosque is the place where resentment of other beliefs or 
of nonbelievers is preached. 
 
For the receiving societies, the arrival of a new religion should be an 
incentive to reconsider the issue of religious freedom. Migration has 
generated religious conflicts in the past, too. Catholic immigrants in 
Protestant America in the nineteenth century, for example, were op-
posed by a major populist movement, the Know Nothings. If you ask 
Muslims to acknowledge freedom of religion you must be prepared to 
do likewise. Only on that basis is a new social contract possible; the 
secularization of governmental institutions must be complete. 
 
In another aspect, too, the old and new migrations differ. That mi-
grants are often poor is nothing new, but the high level of unemploy-
ment among migrants in Western Europe, in particular, is new. One of 
the reasons for that poor outcome is a generous social security system. 
Mass immigration into the welfare state is unique; there are no other 
examples in history. The consequences are visible: Large groups of 
migrants find themselves in a dependent situation without any pros-
pects. What should be a dynamic element in society - immigrants are 
by definition risk-takers and survivors - has become one of the popu-
lation’s most immobile segments. 
 
The subsidized isolation of those migrant families has proved an 
enormous impediment for them, their children and society as a whole. 
In a city such as Amsterdam, 60 percent of Moroccan and Turkish 
men over the age of forty are unemployed or occupationally dis-
abled.11 11
                                                
 From a comparison of the position of first- and second-
generation migrants in education and the labour market, the American 
 
11 11  Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau (SCP), Jaarrapport Integratie 2005 (Den 
Haag, 2005), Hoofdstuk 6, p. 81 ev. 
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researcher John Mollenkopf concludes that Amsterdam scores consid-
erably worse in both areas than New York.12 12
                                                
 
When extensive migration must be justified by the contribution these 
newcomers make to society, long-term unemployment makes that jus-
tification very difficult. It cannot be denied that the welfare state in 
many Western European countries has contributed considerably to 
these enormous differences. The first generation, no longer considered 
necessary after the economic crisis of 1973, ended up living en masse 
on benefits. This demonstrates that the welfare state in its present form 
creates dependence and takes away responsibility. 
 
Finally, there is a third major change in the pattern of integration. 
First-generation migrants often still feel involved in their lands of ori-
gin, a phenomenon seen in all migrations. The Irish in America have 
always been very concerned with the fight for the independence of 
their former country and, later, with the undeclared civil war in North-
ern Ireland. The same applies to Germans in America, who were pre-
occupied by events in their country and experienced direct conse-
quences of both world wars there. 
 
Nothing new so far. Due to modern communications and low-cost 
travel, however, migrants’ bonds with the land of origin are now far 
stronger than in the past, so that today, ethnic groups are often de-
scribed as “transnational communities”, groups of people present in 
more than one society at once. Taking no part in public life, too many 
migrants are tuned into another reality by satellite dish. In the past, 
immigration meant saying goodbye for good, but now people travel 
constantly back and forth to their countries of origin, even if only psy-
chologically. Immigration in the age of constant communication is a 
unique phenomenon. 
 
Tighter bonds between migrant communities and their lands of origin 
contribute to their becoming increasingly a diaspora; migrants de-
 
11 22  John Mollenkopf, “Assimilating Immigrants in Amsterdam”, in Leon Deben 
et al (eds), Understanding Amsterdam: Essays on Eeconomic Vitality, City 
Life and Urban Form (Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 2000). 
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scribe themselves with an eye to the past and have not yet entirely 
given up the illusion of returning home. How often does one hear that 
their bags are packed, often with the argument that the receiving soci-
ety has become so inhospitable that there's no chance of succeeding 
here? This perception is confirmed by the fact that three-quarters of 
young Turkish and Moroccan people born in the Netherlands marry 
someone from their parents' country, in which pressure and force on 
the part of the parents play a dominant role.13 13
 
The outcome of these changing circumstances of migration is great 
uncertainty whether integration will take no more than three genera-
tions. To clarify this likely delay, the second generation is now being 
referred to as a “one-and-a-halfth” generation - in other words, some-
one who is born here marries someone from the land of origin, so their 
children grow up in a family that does not speak the language of the 
land of arrival. The most important advisory body in the Dutch gov-
ernment itself is hesitant about an automatic improvement from gen-
eration to generation: 
The question is whether the cycle can be completed, with a third and 
following generation of all the population categories living in the 
Netherlands being integrated entirely into the society, if the second 
generation has realised too little advancement.14 14
 
 
Without An “Us”, It Won't Work  
 
In the 1920s, Robert Park described the “race relations cycle” that 
progressed from “isolation through competition, conflict and accom-
modation to assimilation”.1515
                                                
 The underlying philosophy is familiar: 
 
11 33  Leen Sterkx and Carolien Bouw, Liefde op maat. Partnerkeuze van Turkse en 
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immigratiesamenleving  (Den Haag: Sdu uitgevers, 2001), pp. 162-63. 
11 55  Summarized in this way by Ulf Hannerz, Exploring the City: Inquiries 
Toward an Urban Anthropology (New York: Columbia University Press, 
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150. 
 58
Arriving migrants tend to isolate themselves, partly due to the stand-
offish reaction of the surrounding society. Later, migrants and their 
children try to win a place for themselves in the land of arrival, which 
leads to friction and conflict. The newcomers and natives then seek a 
compromise and, if that progresses, the surrounding society assimi-
lates the migrants and their descendants. 
 
That is a hopeful cycle, in which one can recognize the model of the 
three generations. The first generation stands for isolation and avoid-
ance; the migrants’ children refuse to accept that and claim their 
rights, inevitably coming into conflict with established citizens, 
prompting a need for compromise. Finally, the grandchildren in the 
third generation have the opportunity to assimilate without too much 
difficulty, participating in the society without too much friction. 
 
Naturally, this is only schematic: reality cannot be divided so neatly. 
There is also much to debate about the assumed final point, “assimila-
tion”, whose definition is very controversial. What concerns me here, 
however, is that the integration of any sizeable migration movement 
inevitably entails conflict. Many European countries are currently em-
broiled in that stage. 
 
It is obvious that we have passed through the avoidance phase. “Mul-
ticulturalism” is the model for that episode, for it tried to find terms 
for the peaceful coexistence of cultural communities existing next to 
each other without much contact. Now, we have inescapably entered 
the throes of a period of conflict that must find a new accommodation. 
That conflict is necessary and can be extremely productive, if we suc-
ceed in keeping violence at bay. 
 
It is difficult to say how long and turbulent this period will be. We still 
know too little about the generational dynamics of integration for the 
simple reason that so far we in Europe have seen too little of the third 
generations, and it is unclear how their changed circumstances will 
affect the integration process. What is clear is that every integration 
process entails conflicts, frictions and clashes. That was so in Amer-
ica, and it is repeating itself in Europe today. 
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Far closer involvement is needed; that must rest upon a clear idea of 
integration. The half-heartedness of the reluctant immigration land is 
eminently demonstrated in the way we treat citizenship. For too long, 
naturalization has been approached too casually. For a long time, the 
philosophy was that quick, easy naturalization aided integration, but 
setting requirements for obtaining nationality actually demands an ef-
fort. The undervaluation of citizenship is not a good idea. If someone 
chooses to adopt a new nationality, in addition to gaining rights, that 
ought to entail the acceptance of obligations. 
 
Professor of law and author of Iranian origin Afshin Ellian describes 
his disillusionment: 
I received the most important decision concerning my life, namely my 
Dutch nationality, by post. It was no more than an administrative let-
ter, signed by the director of the Immigration and Naturalization De-
partment. A deep sense of embarrassment and disappointment tem-
pered my joy. The moment of citizenship should be ritualized, out of 
respect for both the new citizen and the constitution.16 16
                                                
 
You do no favour for migrants who wish to obtain the nationality of 
the land of arrival by demanding nothing of them. Not asking a single 
question makes clear that nobody cares much about an answer. The 
veiled message is: “You will never be part of this society, anyway. We 
don't expect you to have any influence on anything. Just stay where 
you are, don't move outside your own circle and, in particular, cherish 
your own identity”. 
 
That way, no obligations are entered into, because we know full well 
that, when a society makes demands of newcomers, it also undertakes 
an obligation. If you are striving for integration you must clarify the 
fundaments of your own society; if you want to promote respect for 
the legal order, you yourself must know what those rules entail. If you 
want to transfer cultural heritage, you must have an idea of what your 
own history contains. Requirements set for immigrants inevitably 
backfire on those who set them. 
 
 
11 66  Speech by Afshin Ellian. 
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So now we come to the fundamental rule of all integration: The na-
tives should never ask anything of newcomers that they are not pre-
pared to do themselves. The demand for integration hits back hard at 
those who make that demand. As European natives are not sure of the 
degree to which we ourselves still feel part of the larger entity, we 
don't know what we can and cannot ask of newcomers. In other words, 
integration demands self-examination and there has not been much 
enthusiasm for that. We are so tolerant that, above all, we don't want 
to make things difficult for ourselves. 
 
Over the past few years, it has become clear, not only in the Nether-
lands, that the arrival of so many migrants and their difficult integra-
tion into the land of arrival has provoked a real citizenship crisis. All 
the well-meaning jubilation over diversity could provide no answer, 
because the question was unavoidable: What do we have in common, 
taking into account all the differences? What holds society together in 
a time of mass migration, particularly in the urban areas where most 
migrants settle? 
 
The attitude often met these days in immigrant circles is a mixture of 
“What do you actually want of us?” and “For heaven's sake leave us 
alone”. The tone is all too often aggrieved - but if you aim to make the 
gaps narrower than they are, you must be able to answer those ques-
tions convincingly. At the moment, we seem to have no answers. A 
sense of “This is our country now, too” or, even better, of “my coun-
try”, can only ultimately be generated out of a free choice, which mi-
grants are invited and challenged to make, by a society that itself has a 
strong culture of citizenship. 
 
But that tradition has been neglected. There is no clear idea of a new 
“us” encompassing more than the old “us”. Is any effort being made to 
keep the collection of individuals and groups together with a modern 
concept of nation? That search is part of a wider re-evaluation, which 
is about finding a new balance between rights and obligations, be-
tween individual development and mutual dependency, between pri-
vacy and public order. We need a richer idea of what citizenship could 
be in this day and age. 
 
 61
Multiculturalism supplied a noncommittal answer: There is no longer 
such a thing as an “us”. What then remains of citizenship is entirely 
unclear. Without an “us” it won't work; without critical involvement, 
society crumbles. That “us” need not necessarily refer to a shared 
pride; it could just as well be an expression of vicarious shame. For 
example, it has to be progress when a spokesperson from a Turkish 
organization says, “We failed in Srebrenica”.1717
                                                
 Surely the answer to 
that statement cannot be, “But there is no such thing as ‘us’. You 
aren't responsible for the decision to send troops to a so-called safe 
enclave, and neither am I”. We quickly see that an “us” implies a 
shared responsibility. 
 
We began this search for a new citizenship by establishing a sense of 
alienation and loss, on the part of both migrant and native. Once we 
succeed in deriving a renewal from the shock of the unfamiliar, we 
will be further than we are now. Immigration doesn't have to lead to a 
loss of strength; on the contrary, once we succeed in internalizing mi-
gration it will make our societies more universal, and therefore more 
competitive, in a globalizing world. 
 
We are far too overcome by the confrontation with militant Islam, 
which obscures our view of a change we should welcome. The ascent 
of the Asian world can release an energy that could help us out of our 
oppression. Through competition, Europe has already taken steps to-
wards integration; we need that external push from Asia. The same 
applies to the forces released by the arrival of immigrants. The strain 
of allowing people from all over the world to become part of our ur-
ban societies is causing us to reconsider - not by betraying Europe’s 
contributions to the idea of an open society, but by striving to be truer 
to that idea. 
 
The fact that the shock of immigration has been harshly worded above 
perhaps helps make clear the urgency of renewal. Anyone wishing to 
trivialize migration by continually pointing out that there is nothing 
new about it not only misses an important experience being gained in 
the big cities of Europe today - but also, most importantly, fails to see 
 
11 77  Haci Karacaer, then director of  Milli Gorus. 
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that the new migration offers a unique opportunity for introspection 
and self-improvement. The recent immigration forces us to reach 
above ourselves, to rise above our inhibitions. That may be asking a 
lot, but if you don't ask a lot in this world you will fail miserably. 
 
Let me give a couple of examples. A new religion in our midst could 
lead to a truly secular society that lives up to the ideal of religious 
freedom. The unemployment of so many migrants could be the begin-
ning of a re-evaluation of the welfare state, to eliminate unintentional 
obstacles to social mobility. Shortcomings in the preparation of many 
children from immigrant families could lead to an educational system 
that devotes serious attention to language, history and legal culture. 
The arrival of people from former colonies could expand our self-
image, which must encompass the dark side of the colonial past, start-
ing with slavery. The harrowing exclusion of many Muslim women 
could lead us to realize that equal treatment is a recent acquisition that 
should be defended all the more fiercely. And there is so much more 
that would be possible if we were to examine our own shortcomings 
committedly. 
 
Almost a century ago, the American sociologist Henry Pratt Fairchild 
already knew that. Much of what he wrote is now dated, but he was 
capable of seeing that the degree to which migrants are able to feel 
part of the land of arrival does not depend solely on them: “Before 
laying tardy assimilation too readily at the door of the immigrant we 
should thoughtfully consider whether our own house does not need to 
be set in order”. In other words, we can only discuss integration if we 
are willing to improve our society. In Fairchild's words, 
If the immigrant is to love America he must first have the opportunity 
to experience America, and having experienced it he must find it lov-
able. No amount of lecturing, legislating, and threatening can make 
the alien love America if he does not find it lovable, and no amount of 
strangeness and unfamiliarity can keep him from loving it if in the fi-
nal event he finds it worthy of his love.18 18
                                                
 
 
11 88  Henry Pratt Fairchild, Immigration: A World Movement and Its American 
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We have to break with the years of avoidance. Perhaps integration 
was, indeed, successful in past years, and newcomers have simply ad-
justed to the nonchalance of the natives - in a land to which, in many 
respects, you would not want to belong. This is why the impasse in 
which we currently find ourselves demonstrates so many shortcom-
ings of our society. It is time for some major maintenance - in our 
case, a thorough reconstruction. We must not lose sight of the distance 
that separates us from our ideals. After all, an open society thrives on 
self-criticism. We must be willing to become what we say we are. 
 
 
Accommodating Islam 
 
Let me finally illustrate what I mean by “to become what we say we 
are” by discussing Islam's incorporation into the liberal democracies 
of Europe. The current impasse is partly caused by our inability to 
find a more or less stable way of dealing with Islam as a new religion 
in our society. That “our” refers expressly to the Muslims, too. A 
number of clear choices are unavoidable. These will be acceptable, 
however, only if based on the principle of equal treatment. Nothing 
feeds mistrust like the impression of a double standard. 
 
Three concrete questions are involved. First, to what extent is the 
separation of church and state, which forms the basis of religious free-
dom, observed in Europe? On that basis we can then ask Muslims 
whether, in addition to the right to religious freedom, they are also 
willing to accept the duty to defend that same freedom for other be-
liefs and unbeliefs. What's more, Muslims must also be asked whether 
they are willing to grant the freedom they claim as a group to all 
members of their own community. 
 
Let's examine these issues more closely. How could we deal with Is-
lam on the basis of the idea of equal treatment? It begins with the 
separation of church and state, which is the basis of religious freedom. 
There are plenty of misconceptions of that separation. Many people 
think the Netherlands achieved religious tolerance at an early stage. 
But history teaches us that, according to current criteria, there was no 
separation of church and state in the Republic. The seventeenth cen-
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tury saw a struggle between the principle of freedom of conscience on 
one hand, embraced early on, and, on the other, the idea of the Re-
formed Church as the public church, which was privileged by the gov-
ernment. 
 
From that era we can also learn that the separation of church and state 
must not only safeguard the state from improper pressure from the 
church but, equally and sometimes even more, protect the church 
against intervention by the state. Even now, it seems to me that too 
often the separation of church and state is only practiced with a view 
to protecting the state. Certainly with respect to Islam it must be reit-
erated that, in principle, nothing should stand in the way of Muslims 
freely practicing their belief. Mosques belong here on principle. The 
state should adopt a reserved attitude. 
 
When we emphasize this principle of equal treatment, we must ask 
ourselves whether we in Europe actually live up to that idea. Innumer-
able countries have regulations that are at odds with the separation of 
church and state. Consider, for example the church tax Germans are 
obliged to pay, the official position of the Anglican Church in Great 
Britain, the state-subsidized religious schools in the Netherlands and 
elsewhere, or the crucifixes in Italian classrooms and law courts. If 
you ask Muslims to acknowledge religious freedom, you must be pre-
pared to do likewise. Only on the basis of a separation of church and 
state is a new social compromise possible: The secularization of insti-
tutions must be complete. 
 
It is on that basis of equal treatment of religions that limits can and 
should be set. We can only combat political Islam effectively once we 
scrupulously observe the principle of religious freedom. Then, an im-
perative question can be posed to Muslims: Does not the exercise of 
that right to religious freedom entail an irrevocable duty to defend that 
same freedom for other beliefs and for unbelievers? The duty to de-
fend religious freedom is what political Islam contests, not only in 
words but also with threats and violence. 
 
That radical Islamic interpretation was not created in a vacuum. Far 
too often, Muslims divide the world into two, us and them. When reli-
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gious freedom is used to spread contempt for non-Muslims, the right 
that Muslims invoke is undermined. Then, sooner or later, comes the 
moment when Muslims make it impossible for themselves to live in a 
democracy with religious diversity. The right to religious freedom 
goes hand-in-hand with the duty to respect the freedom of others. That 
applies to everyone and therefore also to the Muslim community. If 
they are not prepared to accept this, Muslims will stigmatize and mar-
ginalize themselves. 
 
Earlier this year, I was invited to take part in an inter-religious discus-
sion. As a nonbeliever, I joined an imam, a bishop and a rabbi. Every 
discussion demands a couple of common principles, and a discussion 
among religions certainly demands the acceptance of religious free-
dom as a point of departure. The imam, however, wasn't having any of 
that: Yes, that was what the law of the Netherlands stipulated, but it 
could be different elsewhere; higher authorities had to pass judgement 
on that. We can think about it pragmatically - the imam ultimately ac-
cepted religious freedom in the Netherlands - but that is the route of 
least resistance. Especially when talking about equal treatment, one 
should be able to expect a little more consistency in principle. 
 
The integration of Islam into democracy will therefore demand major 
adjustments. Due to migration, a unique situation has come about: For 
the first time in their history, Muslims constitute a minority in a lib-
eral, secular society. It is therefore premature to judge that democratic 
principles and Islam as practiced here can never be combined. It is an 
open question whether the accommodation of Islam in Europe will 
succeed; with no guarantees, clarity concerning a number of principles 
is crucial. 
 
As a result, the principle of equal treatment has another inevitable 
consequence. If you claim religious freedom as a group, you must be 
prepared to grant that same freedom to the members of your group. As 
it stands now, however, other movements within Islam are often ostra-
cized. Think of the way more liberal groups such as the Alevi and the 
Ahmaddiya movements are excluded. Claiming religious freedom 
should at least entail an acceptance of pluralism within the claimant's 
own circle. Most are not prepared to comply with that principle even 
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within the environment of Islam itself. What we have, then is not a 
Muslim community, but an extremely divided collection of believers 
with little in common. 
 
Muslims already find it difficult to acknowledge differences within 
their own circle, but the subject of apostasy is even more taboo; to 
confess openly that you no longer believe is tantamount to social ex-
clusion or worse. Here, too, though, if a group claims the right as a 
group to freely practice religion, it cannot do otherwise than to ac-
knowledge that same right for members of the same religious commu-
nity, for religion is freely practiced or rejected. That is nothing like the 
case now. 
 
Religious freedom does not exclude religious criticism. On the con-
trary, the price of an open society includes criticism of religious tradi-
tions as part of an open debate. A little subtlety may be expected of 
critics, but, nevertheless, speaking freely about what, for others, is sa-
cred can still sometimes be deeply offensive. That's just the way it is. 
If Muslims want to live here with the idea that the Koran or the 
prophet is above criticism and may never be the subject of satire, they 
are going down a dead-end street. The cartoon affair taught us that re-
ligious freedom and the freedom to criticize religion are inseparable. 
 
I reiterated this argument in an American television programme, 
which generated an exceptionally revealing reaction from a Muslim 
organization in the US. In a public statement they wrote, “We as an 
American Muslim community claim the human right to self-
definition”.i Since when has “self-definition”1919
                                                
 been a human right? 
Since when have only believers been allowed to comment on their 
holy books? Such remarkable assertions do not belong in a democ-
racy; every belief belongs to everybody, in the sense that we can all 
have opinions and freely express them. 
 
The attempts of the Dutch and British governments to reintroduce 
blasphemy as an offense are therefore unwise, to say the least. Why 
should insulting the gods actually be worse than insulting our fellow 
 
11 99  Press statement by the Muslim Public Affairs Council (15 March 2005). 
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human beings? Anyone defending the principle of equal treatment 
cannot do otherwise than to see religious and secular philosophies as 
equal in law. There are certainly limits to the freedom of speech, but 
these do not preclude the criticism or derision of a belief. Otherwise 
we can start burning at the stake Erasmus' In Praise of Folly, with 
chapters such as “Even More Folly in the Bible”. Tolerance cannot be 
based on fear. 
 
Equal treatment does not mean that everyone must suddenly embrace 
liberal ideas. Like other traditional believers, conservative Muslims 
can reject an institution such as homosexual marriage, as long as they 
accept that the majority has decided otherwise for the present. And, 
vice versa, those who criticize religion on principle must be prepared 
to defend religious freedom, as duress in matters of belief is an assault 
on democracy. Diplomatic avoidance does not help in dealing with 
Islam; honesty regarding the shared principles of religious freedom 
does. 
 
For the moment, we are entangled in a conflict with a politicized Is-
lam, the end of which is not yet in sight. That international climate 
casts a shadow on attempts to accommodate Muslim minorities in 
Europe. Nevertheless, when we succeed in that task and find a place 
for Islam in secular and liberal societies, we will have become more 
universal. When we succeed in remaining true to the idea of religious 
freedom and in peacefully incorporating many millions of Muslim 
migrants and their children into our societies, we will have attained a 
privileged position in the world. 
 
Since 1989 Europe has had the opportunity to unite in a peaceful 
manner, not only by overcoming old differences, but also by giving 
migrants a new place. There is no compelling reason why the Old 
World should not be able to reinvent itself. Because plenty of things in 
Europe deserve to be cherished, not brutally modernized, a certain 
reticence is quite understandable. Still, the shock of migration and in-
tegration should be seen as an invitation to live up to the idea of an 
open society. 
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Ute Frevert 
Migration – History – Diversity: 
National Memories and Cultural Identities in Europe 
 
Let me start with an idea of what citizenship is, then proceed with re-
flections on citizenship education and finally end with some thoughts 
on how history ties into it, or, to be more precise: how history can me-
diate between “national memories” and “cultural identities” and thus 
provide a platform for social integration. For the sake of clarity, I have 
organised my talk in 10 brief statements. 
 
1.   Historically, citizenship has been defined as the result of a con-
tinuous expansion of rights. According to Thomas Marshall, a 
British sociologist writing in the 1940s, citizenship in Europe 
has seen three waves of expansion: starting with civic rights 
(f.ex. legal equality, habeas corpus, the right not to be de-
ported), continuing with political rights (voting) and ending 
with social rights (health care, social security). In the light of 
recent multiculturalism, we might add a fourth wave: the right 
to be different and to be protected in one´s being different.  
 
2.   My take on citizenship, though, is somewhat different. I will 
not focus on rights and duties (which I will take for granted), 
but on active participation, on what we might call participatory 
democracy. Why that? Because I consider participatory democ-
racy to be one of the great achievements of European and 
North American History. It is an achievement that was hard to 
get at, and that was often in danger of being lost or weakened. 
It had been manipulated by authoritarian regimes that mistook 
democratic participation for mass mobilisation. It had been 
subdued in formally democratic regimes with strong paternal 
authority figures (like de Gaulle´s France and Adenauer´s 
Germany). But it has seen, by and large, an extraordinary flour-
ishing in recent times. Since the 1960s, Western societies have 
experienced a remarkable widening of the public sphere and an 
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increasing involvement of citizens in the public sphere (new 
social movements, “grass-root democracy” etc.).2020   
 
3.   This – third point – has fundamentally changed the notions of 
politics. No longer can politics be confined to parliament and 
parties and voting patterns. Politics have been expanded, both 
in terms of issues that became “politicised” (remember the slo-
gan: “the personal is political”), and in terms of its modes, pro-
cedures and personnel. More people have gained access to in-
formation and take part in political communication, in school 
or local communities as much as on the federal, European or 
even global level. Issues like abortion or rape, education or 
sexual orientation, the protection of animal species or the in-
troduction of energy saving methods are given wide attention 
among fellow-citizens. Discussion and debate, negotiation and 
contestation have acquired a stronger position than ever before, 
and are less and less influenced by party affiliations. The re-
definition of politics thus displays a general trend: they have 
become less abstract, more tied to personal concerns, and more 
democratic.  
 
4.   Political involvement and participation (in this broader sense) 
are, to be sure, not mandatory. Western democracies grant their 
citizens the right to be apolitical (which distinguishes them 
from totalitarian systems like communism and fascism). But it 
seems that many people actually want to get involved – not so 
much in terms of party membership and long-term commit-
ment, but in the shape of short-term, and limited participation 
(local civic initiatives, students´ projects etc.). Social scientists 
are not quite sure about the general trend: Some speak of a 
growing tendency of “bowling alone” and a weakening of so-
cial ties and associations2121
                                                
, while others highlight the shifting 
 
22 00  Linked to education! Press etc.). – long american tradition (Tocqueville) – 
involvement of citizens in local politics, school boards, charity/philanthropy 
etc. – historical role of associations (even in Europe) 
22 11  see Putnam who refers to a weakening of social ties and, as a consequence, 
political activity. 
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location and timing of politics and are reluctant to discuss it in 
terms of higher or lesser degrees of overall engagement. Most 
observers, though, agree that, as such, citizens´ involvement is 
a good thing: because it places democracy on a broader and 
deeper scale, it is one of the checks and balances that democ-
ratic government depends on, and it commits citizens to their 
society and state (citizens as agents of politics, rather than re-
cipients of political decisions). The latter point is, of course, 
crucial for immigrant societies. “Integrating” new citizens ul-
timately means inviting them to take part in the institutions and 
practices of the host society, above all in its public sphere. 
 
5.   This said, what can societies do to increase citizens´ participa-
tion, to encourage and enable it?  On a general level, what can 
they do to ensure that every citizen has the chance and the re-
sources to take part in public debate, association and decision-
making? This is, again, not just about rights and entitlement. 
Rather, it is about the resources that allow people to practice 
their rights – we might call it the resource-driven approach. 
What are those “resources”? Very basically, they comprise 
things like personal safety, physical integrity, food, clothing, 
shelter, health. Still, it needs more to become an active citizen. 
Information is another important resource, with education 
closely linked. Without access to information and knowledge, 
people cannot communicate with one another. On top of that, 
they require skills of communication, like polite and civil man-
ners, and basic training in how to conduct a debate, how to lis-
ten to one another, how to make an argument and defend it 
against criticism. These skills depend on a clear set of values: 
respect for each other, tolerance of other attitudes, abdication 
of violence. Such values and skills have to be widely propa-
gated - and taught: in the family as much as in schools, at the 
workplace, in the media and in public institutions (like town-
halls, trade unions, or churches). 
 
6.   But citizen education should not stop here. Teaching democ-
ratic values and practices, implies teaching about their devel-
opment and appropriation. How did we become democrats? 
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How did we learn democracy, and how could we, at times, for-
get about it? Democracy, after all, is not a given thing. It had to 
be invented, popularised, fought for and defended. It did not 
come easy. Each country had to face a number of challenges in 
order to establish a political system that granted the rule of law, 
civic rights, the separation of powers and public participation. 
Each society had to overcome a great deal of obstacles before it 
cast itself as a civil society based on mutual respect, solidarity, 
and an abdication of violence. Each nation had to experience 
quite a bit of turmoil and stress until it embraced all its mem-
bers, regardless of sex, race or religion. And, to be sure, those 
achievements were not there to last. European history has many 
tales to tell about democracy being curtailed, diminished, abol-
ished, about civil rights being suspended or denied altogether. 
Within and without Europe, democracy was and still is – and 
will always be - an imperilled project. 
 
7.   This is why history matters. If told in a critical, self-reflective 
way, it can serve as a major educational force reaching out to 
both old and new citizens. On the one hand, it reminds those 
whose families and ancestors had, in one way or another, 
shared the nation´s past, (it reminds them) of the problematic 
aspects of this past – of wrong directions taken, cruel deeds 
performed, non-democratic practices enacted. It does not con-
ceive of the modern democratic age as a kind of via trium-
phalis, as a one-way-road of glorious success and national 
pride. Instead, it presents it as a map of diverging boulevards 
and alleys, including a number of dead-end-streets and no-go-
areas. It tells about democracy as an endangered species – and 
about the reasons why we might and should be inclined to de-
fend it by all means. On the other hand, history also reaches out 
to new citizens, to immigrants who carry different national 
memories or cultural identities. It teaches them that their host 
country´s history is not as immaculate, heroic and “superior” as 
it is often presented. As such, it defies identification, and rather 
calls for critical distance and reflection – thus making it easier 
for immigrants to approach and accept it. History can therefore 
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actually bridge the gap between long-term citizens and new 
immigrant generations. Rather than divide, it can unite. 
 
8.   This might come as a surprise. Most of us are used to think of 
history as a divisive matter. We have read about young Turks 
in Germany, who refuse to be part of the collective that re-
members the Holocaust as the crucial moment of national his-
tory. We have heard about Arab or African immigrants to 
France who feel left out of the historical narrative that recon-
structs the benevolent achievements of French civilization. And 
we wonder about the sense of historical estrangement that 
might befall African or South American immigrants to Portugal 
when they are greeted by the Padrao dos Descobrimentos cele-
brating the European quest for discovery and conquest in non-
European regions. Immigrants from non-European countries, 
so the general argument runs, cannot identify with European 
history, for a couple of reasons: a) Either they are left out of 
this history, and their personal or collective experiences are ex-
cluded; or, b) they are negatively involved in the historical nar-
rative, be it as colonial subjects or as victims of imperialism; or 
c) they are not prepared to accept the “negative property” (Jean 
Améry) of the host country, f.ex. the Holocaust as the defining 
factor of German historical consciousness. 
 
9.   This said, what makes me think and argue that history can do 
better? That it can reach out to immigrants as well and, even 
more, contribute to their democratic education? Above all, it is 
the American example. Living in the US, teaching history at a 
major university, and having kids in American high schools 
taught me a crucial lesson. Or maybe more than one. America, 
as we all know, is the classical immigrant society. Unlike most 
European countries, the US openly embraces its identity as a 
country of immigrants. Many people have commented on the 
extraordinary speed and degree to which immigrants absorbed 
and still absorb the dominant culture. The second generation 
normally speaks fluent American English, embraces American 
popular culture including fast food and Hollywood movies. 
Schools welcome immigrant children with elaborate programs 
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of learning English as a second language and helping their 
families to adjust to American life and manners. This seems to 
work perfectly well for the large majority of those who come to 
this country because they want to do better or want their chil-
dren to do better. The educational system – diverse as it is – 
has a great share in this. But now, what does history have to 
contribute? Let me just mention three things. First: there is 
definitely a strong focus on democracy and its development in 
the US. The founding fathers play a huge role – although they 
are no longer depicted as faultless heroes. The issue of slavery 
looms large, and so does the fate of America´s native popula-
tion. The history of democracy is presented as a story of at-
tempted exclusion and the constant fight for inclusion. Second: 
There is an equally strong focus on the history of immigration, 
its successes and pitfalls. Immigrants are not presented as alien 
intruders, but as assets of American culture and society. Third, 
much more attention (compared to Europe) is given to non-
American history. Students learn about other continents and 
world regions as well: about Chinese and Indian civilization, 
about Africa and South America, and, of course, about Europe. 
This helps them to recognize and appreciate their own heritage 
and cultural identity. 
 
10.   To conclude and slightly modify a slogan from former East 
Germany: To learn from America helps us to win. It helps us 
Europeans to win the hearts and minds of new citizens, and it 
helps us to strengthen our continent as a place of democratic 
citizenship. History can contribute a lot – if it is taught with a 
keen eye on diversity rather than homogeneity, and in a spirit 
of critical appraisal rather than blowing one´s own national 
trumpet. 
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José Casanova2  2 22
                                                
Religion, European Secular Identities, 
and European Integration 
 
The rapid and drastic process of secularization in western Europe over 
the last decades has not diminished the continuing unease with which 
Europe considers the Islamic religion and Muslims in its midst. In this 
benchmark essay from 2004, José Casanova argues that the "Islam 
problem" is an indicator of the disparity between liberal and illiberal 
strands of European secularism. 
 
Focal Point: Post-secular Europe? 
Is religion a public or a private matter? Can there be such a thing as a 
European Islam? If so, what characterizes it? What role can religion -- 
or religions -- play when it comes to the emergence of a European 
solidarity? In a series of articles, Eurozine focuses on post-secular 
tendencies and religion(s) in the new Europe.  
 
Since the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 that established the 
EEC and initiated the ongoing process of European integration, west-
ern European societies have undergone a rapid, drastic, and seemingly 
irreversible process of secularization. In this respect, one can talk of 
the emergence of a post-Christian Europe. At the same time, the proc-
ess of European integration, the eastward expansion of the European 
Union, and the drafting of a European constitution have triggered fun-
damental questions concerning European identity and the role of 
Christianity in that identity. What constitutes "Europe"? How and 
where should one draw the external territorial and the internal cultural 
boundaries of Europe? The most controversial and anxiety-producing 
issues, which are rarely confronted openly, are the potential integra-
tion of Turkey and the potential integration of non-European immi-
grants, who in most European countries happen to be overwhelmingly 
Muslim. It is the interrelation between these phenomena that I would 
like to explore in this paper. 
 
 
22 22  See www.eurozine.com/articles/2004-07-29-casanova-en. 
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The progressive, though highly uneven, secularization of Europe is an 
undeniable social fact.2323  An increasing majority of the European popu-
lation has ceased to participate in traditional religious practices, at 
least on a regular basis, while still maintaining relatively high levels of 
private individual religious beliefs. In this respect, one should perhaps 
talk of the unchurching of the European population and of religious 
individualization, rather than of secularization. Grace Davie has char-
acterized this general European situation as "believing without belong-
ing".2424 At the same time, however, large numbers of Europeans even in 
the most secular countries still identify themselves as "Christian," 
pointing to an implicit, diffused, and submerged Christian cultural 
identity. In this sense, Danièle Hervieu-Léger is also correct when she 
offers the reverse characterization of the European situation as "be-
longing without believing."2525
                                                
 "Secular" and "Christian" cultural identi-
ties are intertwined in complex and rarely verbalized modes among 
most Europeans. 
 
The most interesting issue sociologically is not the fact of progressive 
religious decline among the European population, but the fact that this 
decline is interpreted through the lenses of the secularization paradigm 
and is therefore accompanied by a "secularist" self-understanding that 
interprets the decline as "normal" and "progressive", that is, as a 
quasi-normative consequence of being a "modern" and "enlightened" 
European. It is this "secular" identity shared by European elites and 
ordinary people alike, that paradoxically turns "religion" and the 
barely submerged Christian European identity into a thorny and per-
plexing issue when it comes to delimiting the external geographic 
boundaries and to defining the internal cultural identity of a European 
Union in the process of being constituted. 
 
22 33  Cf. David Martin, A General Theory of Secularization, London 1978; and 
Andrew Greeley, Religion in Modern Europe at the End of the Second 
Millennium, London 2003. 
22 44  Grace Davie, Religion in Britain Since 1945: Believing without Belonging, 
Oxford 1994, and Religion in Modern Europe: A Memory Mutates, Oxford 
2000. 
22 55  Danièle Hervieu-Léger, "Religion und sozialer Zusammenhalt", Transit 26 
(2003/2004). 
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I would like to explore some of the ways in which religion has be-
come a perplexing issue in the constitution of "Europe" through a re-
view of four ongoing controversial debates: the role of Catholic Po-
land, the incorporation of Turkey, the integration of non-European 
immigrants, and the place of God or of the Christian heritage in the 
text of the new European constitution. 
 
Catholic Poland in post-Christian Europe: 
Secular normalization or great apostolic assignment? 
 
The fact that Catholic Poland is "re-joining Europe" at a time when 
western Europe is forsaking its Christian civilizational identity has 
produced a perplexing situation for Catholic Poles and secular Euro-
peans alike. In a previous issue of Transit, I examined the convoluted, 
long historical patterns of convergence and divergence in Polish and 
western European religious developments.2626
                                                
 It suffices to state here 
that throughout the Communist era, Polish Catholicism went through 
an extraordinary revival at the very same time when western European 
societies were undergoing a drastic process of secularization. The re-
integration of Catholic Poland into secular Europe can be viewed 
therefore as "a difficult challenge" and/or as "a great apostolic as-
signment". Anticipating the threat of secularization, the integralist sec-
tors of Polish Catholicism have adopted a negative attitude towards 
European integration. Exhorted by the Polish Pope, the leadership of 
the Polish church, by contrast, has embraced European integration as a 
great apostolic assignment. 
 
The anxieties of the "Europhobes" would seem to be fully justified 
since the basic premise of the secularization paradigm, that the more a 
society modernizes, the more secular it becomes, seems to be a wide-
spread assumption, also in Poland. Since modernization, in the sense 
of catching up with European levels of political, economic, social, and 
cultural development, is one of the goals of European integration, 
most observers tend to anticipate that such a modernization will lead 
to secularization also in Poland, putting an end to Polish religious "ex-
 
22 66  José Casanova, "Das katholische Polen in säkularisierten Europa", Transit 25 
(2003). 
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ceptionalism". Poland becoming at last a "normal" and "unexcep-
tional" European country is after all one of the aims of the "Euroen-
thusiasts". 
 
The Polish Episcopate, nevertheless, has accepted enthusiastically the 
papal apostolic assignment and has repeatedly stressed that one of its 
goals once Poland rejoins Europe is "to restore Europe for Christian-
ity". While it may sound preposterous to western European ears, such 
a message has found resonance in the tradition of Polish messianism. 
Barring a radical change in the European secular zeitgeist, however, 
such an evangelistic effort has little chance of success. Given the loss 
of demand for religion in western Europe, the supply of surplus Polish 
pastoral resources for a Europe-wide evangelizing effort is unlikely to 
prove effective. The at best lukewarm, if not outright hostile European 
response to John Paul II's renewed calls for a European Christian re-
vival points to the difficulty of the assignment. 
 
I've suggested that a less ambitious, though no less arduous, apostolic 
assignment could perhaps have equally remarkable effects. Let Poland 
prove the secularization thesis wrong. Let Polonia simper fidelis keep 
faith in its Catholic identity and tradition while succeeding in its inte-
gration into Europe, thus becoming a "normal" European country. 
Such an outcome, if feasible, could suggest that the decline of religion 
in Europe might be not a teleological process necessarily linked with 
modernization but a historical choice that Europeans have made. A 
modern religious Poland could perhaps force secular Europeans to re-
think their secularist assumptions and realize that it is not so much Po-
land which is out of sync with modern trends, but rather secular 
Europe which is out of sync with the rest of the world. Granted, such a 
provocative scenario is only meant to break the spell which secularism 
holds over the European mind and over the social sciences. 
 
Could a democratic Muslim Turkey ever join the European 
Christian club. Or, which is the torn country? 
 
While the threat of a Polish Christian crusade awakens little fear 
among secular Europeans confident of their ability to assimilate 
Catholic Poland on their own terms, the prospect of Turkey joining the 
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European Union generates much greater anxieties among Europeans, 
Christian and post-Christian alike, but of the kind which cannot be 
easily verbalized, at least not publicly. Turkey has been patiently 
knocking on the door of the European club since 1959, only to be told 
politely to keep waiting, while watching latecomer after latecomer be-
ing invited first in successive waves of accession. 
 
The formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 
1951 by the six founding members (Benelux, France, Italy, and West 
Germany) and its expansion into the European Economic Community 
(EEC) or "common market" in 1957 was predicated upon two historic 
reconciliations: the reconciliation between France and Germany, two 
countries which had been at war or preparing for war from 1870 to 
1945; and the reconciliation between Protestants and Catholics within 
Christian Democracy. Indeed ruling or prominent Christian Democrats 
in all six countries played the leading role in the initial process of 
European integration. The Cold War, the Marshall Plan, NATO, and 
the newly established Washington-Rome Axis formed the geopolitical 
context for both reconciliations. Greece in June 1959 and Turkey in 
July 1959, hostile enemies yet members of NATO, were the first two 
countries to apply for association to the EEC. That same July, the 
other western European countries formed EFTA as an alternative eco-
nomic association. Only Franco's Spain was left out of all initial west-
ern European associations and alliances. 
 
The EEC always made clear that candidates for admission would have 
to meet stringent economic and political conditions. Ireland, The 
United Kingdom, and Denmark formally applied for admission in 
1961 but only joined in 1973. Spain and Portugal were unambiguously 
rebuffed as long as they had authoritarian regimes, but were given 
clear conditions and definite timetables once their democracies 
seemed on the road to consolidation. Both joined in 1986. Greece, 
meanwhile, had already gained admission in 1981 and with it de facto 
veto power over Turkey's admission. But even after Greece and Tur-
key entered a quasi-détente and Greece expressed its readiness to 
sponsor Turkey's admission in exchange for the admission of the en-
tire island of Cyprus, Turkey still did not receive an unambiguous an-
swer, being told once again to go back to the end of the queue. The 
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fall of the Berlin Wall once again rearranged the priorities and the di-
rection of European integration eastward. In 2004, ten new members, 
eight ex-Communist countries plus Malta and Cyprus are set to join 
the European Union. Practically all the territories of Medieval Chris-
tendom, that is, of Catholic and Protestant Europe, will now be re-
united in the new Europe. Only Catholic Croatia and "neutral" Swit-
zerland will be left out, while "Orthodox" Greece as well as Greek and 
Turkish Cyprus will be the only religious "other". "Orthodox" Roma-
nia and Bulgaria are supposed to be next in line, but without a clear 
timetable. Even less clear is if and when the negotiations for Turkey's 
admission will begin in earnest. 
 
The first open, if not yet formal, discussions of Turkey's candidacy 
during the 2002 Copenhagen summit touched a raw nerve among all 
kinds of European "publics". The widespread debate revealed how 
much "Islam" with all its distorted representations as "the other" of 
Western civilization was the real issue rather than the extent to which 
Turkey was ready to meet the same stringent economic and political 
conditions as all other new members. About Turkey's eagerness to join 
and willingness to meet the conditions, there could be no doubt now 
that the new, officially no longer "Islamic" government had reiterated 
unambiguously the position of all the previous Turkish "secularist" 
administrations. Turkey's "publics", secularist and Muslim alike, had 
spoken in unison. The new government was certainly the most repre-
sentative democratic government of all of Turkey's modern history. A 
wide consensus had seemingly been reached among the Turkish popu-
lation, showing that Turkey, on the issue of joining Europe and thus 
"the West", was no longer a "torn country". Two of the three require-
ments stated by Samuel Huntington for a torn country to redefine suc-
cessfully its civilizational identity had clearly been met: "First, the po-
litical and economic elite of the country has to be generally supportive 
of and enthusiastic about this move. Second, the public has to be at 
least willing to acquiesce in the redefinition of identity."2727
                                                
 It was the 
third requirement that apparently was missing: "The dominant ele-
 
22 77  Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World 
Order, New York 1996, 139. 
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ments in the host civilization, in most cases the West, have to be will-
ing to embrace the convert." 
 
The dream of Kemal, "Father of the Turks", of begetting a modern 
Western secular republican Turkish nation-state modeled after French 
republican laïcité has proven not easily attainable, at least not on Ke-
malist secularist terms. But the possibility of a Turkish democratic 
state, truly representative of its ordinary Muslim population, joining 
the European Union, is today for the first time real. The "six arrows" 
of Kemalism (republicanism, nationalism, secularism, statism, popu-
lism, and reformism) could not lead towards a workable representative 
democracy. Ultimately, the project of constructing such a nation-state 
from above was bound to fail because it was too secular for the 
Islamists, too Sunni for the Alevis, and too Turkish for the Kurds. A 
Turkish state in which the collective identities and interests of those 
groups that constitute the overwhelming majority of the population 
cannot find public representation cannot possibly be a truly represen-
tative democracy, even if it is founded on modern secular republican 
principles. But Muslim Democracy is as possible and viable today in 
Turkey as Christian Democracy was half a century ago in western 
Europe. The still Muslim, but officially no longer Islamist party in 
power has been repeatedly accused of being "fundamentalist" and of 
undermining the sacred secularist principles of the Kemalist constitu-
tion which bans "religious" as well as "ethnic" parties, religion and 
ethnicity being forms of identity which are not allowed public repre-
sentation in secular Turkey.  
 
One wonders whether democracy does not become an impossible 
"game" when potential majorities are not allowed to win elections, and 
when secular civilian politicians ask the military to come to the rescue 
of democracy by banning these potential majorities, which threaten 
their secular identity and their power. Practically every continental 
European country has had religious parties at one time or another. 
Many of them, particularly the Catholic ones, had dubious democratic 
credentials until the negative learning experience of Fascism turned 
them into Christian Democratic parties. Unless people are allowed to 
play the game fairly, it may be difficult for them to appreciate the 
rules and to acquire a democratic habitus. One wonders who the real 
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"fundamentalists" are here. "Muslims" who want to gain public recog-
nition of their identity and demand the right to mobilize in order to 
advance their ideal and material interests, while respecting the democ-
ratic rules of the game, or "secularists" who view the Muslim veil 
worn by a duly elected parliamentary representative as a threat to 
Turkish democracy and as a blasphemous affront against the sacred 
secularist principles of the Kemalist state? Could the European Union 
accept the public representation of Islam within its boundaries? Can 
"secular" Europe admit "Muslim" democratic Turkey? Officially, 
Europe's refusal to accept Turkey so far is mainly based on Turkey's 
deficient human rights record. But there are not-too-subtle indications 
that an outwardly secular Europe is still too Christian when it comes 
to the possibility of imagining a Muslim country as part of the Euro-
pean community. One wonders whether Turkey represents a threat to 
Western civilization or rather an unwelcome reminder of the barely 
submerged yet inexpressible and anxiety-ridden "white" European 
Christian identity.  
 
The widespread public debate in Europe over Turkey's admission 
showed that Europe was actually the torn country, deeply divided over 
its cultural identity, unable to answer the question whether European 
unity, and therefore its external and internal boundaries, should be de-
fined by the common heritage of Christianity and Western civilization 
or by its modern secular values of liberalism, universal human rights, 
political democracy, and tolerant and inclusive multiculturalism. Pub-
licly, of course, European liberal secular elites could not share the 
Pope's definition of European civilization as essentially Christian. But 
they also could not verbalize the unspoken "cultural" requirements 
that make the integration of Turkey into Europe such a difficult issue. 
The spectre of millions of Turkish citizens already in Europe but not 
of Europe, many of them second-generation immigrants, caught be-
tween an old country they have left behind and their European host 
societies unable or unwilling to fully assimilate them, only makes the 
problem the more visible. "Guest workers" can be successfully incor-
porated economically. They may even gain voting rights, at least on 
the local level, and prove to be model or at least ordinary citizens. But 
can they pass the unwritten rules of cultural European membership or 
are they to remain "strangers"? Can the European Union open new 
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conditions for the kind of multiculturalism that its constituent national 
societies find so difficult to accept? 
 
Can the European Union welcome and integrate the immi-
grant "other"? Comparative perspectives from the Ameri-
can experience of immigration 
 
Throughout the modern era, western European societies have been 
immigrant-sending countries, indeed the primary immigrant-sending 
region in the world. During the colonial phase, European colonists and 
colonizers, missionaries, entrepreneurs, and colonial administrators 
settled all corners of the globe. During the age of industrialization, 
from the 1800s to the 1920s, it is estimated that ca. 85 million Euro-
peans emigrated to the Americas, to Southern Africa, to Australia and 
Oceania, 60 per cent of them to the United States alone. In the last 
decades, however, the migration flows have reversed and many west-
ern European societies have instead become centres of global immi-
gration. A comparison with the United States, the paradigmatic immi-
grant society (despite the fact that from the late 1920s to the late 
1960s it also became a society relatively closed to immigration), re-
veals some characteristic differences in the contemporary western 
European experience of immigration. 
 
Although the proportion of foreign immigrants in many European 
countries (United Kingdom, France, Holland, West Germany before 
reunification), at approximately 10 percent is similar to the proportion 
of foreign born in the United States, most of these countries still have 
difficulty viewing themselves as permanent immigrant societies or 
viewing the native second generation as nationals, irrespective of their 
legal status. But it is in the different ways in which they try to ac-
commodate and regulate immigrant religions, particularly Islam, that 
European societies distinguish themselves not only from the United 
States but also from one another. European societies have markedly 
different institutional and legal structures regarding religious associa-
tions, very diverse policies of state recognition, of state regulation, 
and of state aid to religious groups, as well as diverse norms concern-
ing when and where one may publicly express religious beliefs and 
practices.  
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In their dealing with immigrant religions, European countries, like the 
United States, tend to replicate their particular model of separation of 
church and state and the patterns of regulation of their own religious 
minorities. France's etatist secularist model and the political culture of 
laïcité require the strict privatization of religion, eliminating religion 
from any public forum, while at the same time pressuring religious 
groups to organize themselves into a single centralized church-like in-
stitutional structure that can be regulated by and serve as interlocutor 
to the state, following the traditional model of the concordat with the 
Catholic Church. Great Britain, by contrast, while maintaining the es-
tablished Church of England, allows greater freedom of religious as-
sociations which deal directly with local authorities and school boards 
to press for changes in religious education, diet, etc, with little direct 
appeal to the central government. Germany, following the multi-
establishment model, has tried to organize a quasi-official Islamic in-
stitution, at times in conjunction with parallel strivings on the part of 
the Turkish state to regulate its diaspora. But the internal divisions 
among immigrants from Turkey and the public expression and mobili-
zation of competing identities (secular and Muslim, Alevi, and Kurd) 
in the German democratic context have undermined any project of in-
stitutionalization from above. Holland, following its traditional pattern 
of pillarization, seemed, until very recently at least, bent on establish-
ing a state-regulated but self-organized separate Muslim pillar. Lately, 
however, even liberal tolerant Holland is expressing second thoughts 
and seems ready to pass more restrictive legislation setting clear limits 
to the kinds of un-European, un-modern norms and habits it is ready 
to tolerate.  
 
If one looks at the European Union as a whole, however, there are two 
fundamental differences with the situation in the United States. In the 
first place, in Europe immigration and Islam are almost synonymous. 
The overwhelming majority of immigrants in most European coun-
tries, the UK being the main exception, are Muslims and the over-
whelming majority of western European Muslims are immigrants. 
This identification appears even more pronounced in those cases when 
the majority of Muslim immigrants tend to come predominantly from 
a single region of origin, e.g., Turkey in the case of Germany, the 
Ma'ghreb in the case of France. This entails a superimposition of dif-
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ferent dimensions of "otherness" that exacerbates issues of boundaries, 
accommodation and incorporation. The immigrant, the religious, the 
racial, and the socio-economic disprivileged "other" all tend to coin-
cide.  
 
In the United States, by contrast, Muslims constitute at most 10 per-
cent of all new immigrants, a figure that is actually likely to decrease 
given the strict restrictions to Arab and Muslim immigration imposed 
after September 11 by the increasingly repressive American security 
state. Since the US Census Bureau, the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service, and other government agencies are not allowed to gather 
information on religion, there are no reliable estimates on the number 
of Muslims in the United States.2828
                                                
 Available estimates range widely 
between 2,8 million and 8 million. Moreover, it is estimated that from 
30 to 42 percent of all Muslims in the United States are African-
American converts to Islam, making more difficult the characteriza-
tion of Islam as a foreign, un-American religion. Furthermore, the 
Muslim immigrant communities in the United Sates are extremely di-
verse in terms of geographic region of origin from all over the Muslim 
world, in terms of discursive Islamic traditions, and in terms of socio-
economic characteristics. As a result, the dynamics of interaction with 
other Muslim immigrants, with African-American Muslims, with non-
Muslim immigrants from the same regions of origin, and with their 
immediate American hosts, depending upon socio-economic charac-
teristics and residential patterns, are much more complex and diverse 
than anything one finds in Europe.  
 
The second main difference has to do with the role of religion and re-
ligious group identities in public life and in the organization of civil 
society. Internal differences notwithstanding, western European socie-
ties are deeply secular societies, shaped by the hegemonic knowledge 
regime of secularism. As liberal democratic societies they tolerate and 
respect individual religious freedom. But due to the pressure towards 
the privatization of religion, which among European societies has be-
come a taken-for-granted characteristic of the self-definition of a 
 
22 88  Karen Isaksen Leonard, Muslims in the United States. The State of Research, 
New York 2003 
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modern secular society, those societies have a much greater difficulty 
in recognizing some legitimate role for religion in public life and in 
the organization and mobilization of collective group identities. Mus-
lim organized collective identities and their public representations be-
come a source of anxiety not only because of their religious otherness 
as a non-Christian and non-European religion, but more importantly 
because of their religiousness itself as the other of European secular-
ity. In this context, the temptation to identify Islam and fundamental-
ism becomes the more pronounced. Islam, by definition, becomes the 
other of Western secular modernity. Therefore, the problems posed by 
the incorporation of Muslim immigrants become consciously or un-
consciously associated with seemingly related and vexatious issues 
concerning the role of religion in the public sphere, which European 
societies assumed they had already solved according to the liberal 
secular norm of privatization of religion.  
 
By contrast, Americans are demonstrably more religious than the 
Europeans and therefore there is a certain pressure for immigrants to 
conform to American religious norms.2929  It is generally the case that 
immigrants in America tend to be more religious than they were in 
their home countries. But even more significantly, today as in the past 
religion and public religious denominational identities play an impor-
tant role in the process of incorporation of the new immigrants. The 
thesis of Will Herberg concerning the old European immigrant, that 
"not only was he expected to retain his old religion, as he was not ex-
pected to retain his old language or nationality, but such was the shape 
of America that it was largely in and through religion that he, or rather 
his children and grandchildren, found an identifiable place in Ameri-
can life," is still operative with the new immigrants.3030
                                                
 The thesis im-
plies that collective religious identities have been one of the primary 
ways of structuring internal societal pluralism in American history.  
 
 
22 99  José Casanova, "Beyond European and American Exceptionalisms: towards a 
Global Perspective," in G. Davie, P. Heelas, and L. Woodhead, eds., 
Predicting Religion, Aldershot 2003. 
33 00  Will Herberg, Protestant-Catholic-Jew, Chicago 1983, 27-8. 
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One should add as a corrective to the thesis that not religion alone, as 
Herberg's study would seem to imply, and not race alone, as contem-
porary immigration studies tend to imply, but religion and race and 
their complex entanglements have served to structure the American 
experience of immigrant incorporation, indeed are the keys to "Ameri-
can exceptionalism". Today, once again, we are witnessing various 
types of collision and collusion between religious identity formation 
and racial identity formation, processes that are likely to have signifi-
cant repercussions for the present and future organization of American 
multiculturalism. Religion and race are becoming, once again, the two 
critical markers identifying the new immigrants either as assimilable 
or as suspiciously "alien". 
 
Due to the corrosive logic of racialization, so pervasive in American 
society, the dynamics of religious identity formation assume a double 
positive form in the process of immigrant incorporation. Given the in-
stitutionalized acceptance of religious pluralism, the affirmation of re-
ligious identities is enhanced among the new immigrants. This posi-
tive affirmation is reinforced moreover by what appears to be a com-
mon defensive reaction by most immigrant groups against ascribed 
racialization, particularly against the stigma of racial darkness. In this 
respect, religious and racial self-identifications and ascriptions repre-
sent alternative ways of organizing American multiculturalism. One of 
the obvious advantages of religious pluralism over racial pluralism is 
that, under proper constitutional institutionalization, it is more recon-
cilable with principled equality and non-hierachic diversity, and there-
fore with genuine multiculturalism.  
 
American society is entering a new phase. The traditional model of 
assimilation, turning European nationals into American "ethnics", can 
no longer serve as a model of assimilation now that immigration is lit-
erally world-wide. America is bound to become "the first new global 
society" made up of all world religions and civilizations, at a time 
when religious civilizational identities are regaining prominence on 
the global stage. At the very same moment that political scientists like 
Samuel Huntington are announcing the impending clash of civiliza-
tions in global politics, a new experiment in intercivilizational encoun-
ters and accommodation between all the world religions is taking 
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place at home.3131
                                                
 American religious pluralism is expanding and incor-
porating all the world religions in the same way as it previously incor-
porated the religions of the old immigrants. A complex process of mu-
tual accommodation is taking place. Like Catholicism and Judaism 
before, other world religions, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism are being 
"Americanized" and in the process they are transforming American 
religion, while the religious diasporas in America are simultaneously 
serving as catalysts for the transformation of the old religions in their 
civilizational homes, in the same way as American Catholicism had an 
impact upon the transformation of world Catholicism and American 
Judaism has transformed world Judaism.  
 
This process of institutionalization of expanding religious pluralism is 
facilitated by the dual clause of the First Amendment which guaran-
tees the "no establishment" of religion at the state level, and therefore 
the strict separation of church and state and the genuine neutrality of 
the secular state, as well as the "free exercise" of religion in civil soci-
ety, that includes strict restrictions on state intervention and on the 
administrative regulation of the religious field. It is this combination 
of a rigidly secular state and the constitutionally protected free exer-
cise of religion in society that distinguishes the American institutional 
context from the European one. In Europe one finds on the one ex-
treme the case of France, where a secularist state not only restricts and 
regulates the exercise of religion in society but actually imposes upon 
society its republican ideology of laïcité, and on the other the case of 
England, where an established state church is compatible with a wide 
toleration of religious minorities and a relatively unregulated free ex-
ercise of religion in society.  
 
As liberal democratic systems, all European societies respect the pri-
vate exercise of religion, including Islam, as an individual human 
right. It is the public and collective free exercise of Islam as an immi-
grant religion that most European societies find difficult to tolerate 
 
33 11  Indeed, one of the most questionable aspects of Huntington's thesis is his 
nativist anti-immigrant and anti-multi-culturalist posture in order to protect 
the supposedly Western civilizational purity of the United States from 
hybridization. 
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precisely on the grounds that Islam is perceived as an "un-European" 
religion. The stated rationales for considering Islam "un-European" 
vary significantly across Europe and among social and political 
groups. For the anti-immigrant, xenophobic, nationalist Right, repre-
sented by Le Pen's discourse in France and by Jörg Haider in Austria, 
the message is straightforward. Islam is unwelcome and un-
assimilable simply because it is a "foreign" immigrant religion. Such a 
nativist and usually racist attitude can be differentiated clearly from 
the conservative "Catholic" position, paradigmatically expressed by 
the Cardinal of Bologna when he declared that Italy should welcome 
immigrants of all races and regions of the world, but should particu-
larly select Catholic immigrants in order to preserve the Catholic iden-
tity of the country.  
 
Liberal secular Europeans tend to look askance at such blatant expres-
sions of racist bigotry and religious intolerance. But when it comes to 
Islam, secular Europeans tend to reveal the limits and prejudices of 
modern secularist toleration. One is not likely to hear among liberal 
politicians and secular intellectuals explicitly xenophobic or anti-
religious statements. The politically correct formulation tends to run 
along such lines as "we welcome each and all immigrants irrespective 
of race or religion as long as they are willing to respect and accept our 
modern liberal secular European norms". The explicit articulation of 
those norms may vary from country to country. The controversies 
over the Muslim veil in so many European societies and the over-
whelming support among the French citizenry, including apparently a 
majority of French Muslims, for the recently passed restrictive legisla-
tion prohibiting the wearing of Muslim veils and other ostensibly reli-
gious symbols in public schools, as "a threat to national cohesion", 
may be an extreme example of illiberal secularism. But in fact one 
sees similar trends of restrictive legislation directed at immigrant 
Muslims in liberal Holland, precisely in the name of protecting its lib-
eral tolerant traditions from the threat of illiberal, fundamentalist, pa-
triarchal customs reproduced and transmitted to the younger genera-
tion by Muslim immigrants.  
 
Revealingly enough, Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin, in his ad-
dress to the French legislature defending the banning of ostensibly re-
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ligious symbols in public schools made reference in the same breath to 
France as "the old land of Christianity" and to the inviolable principle 
of laïcité, exhorting Islam to adapt itself to the principle of secularism 
as all other religions of France have done before. "For the most re-
cently arrived, I'm speaking here of Islam, secularism is a chance, the 
chance to be a religion of France."3232
                                                
 The Islamic veil and other reli-
gious signs are justifiably banned from public schools, he added, be-
cause "they are taking on a political meaning", while according to the 
secularist principle of privatization of religion, "religion cannot be a 
political project". Time will tell whether the restrictive legislation will 
have the intended effect of stopping the spread of "radical Islam" or 
whether it is likely to bring forth the opposite result of radicalizing 
further an already alienated and maladjusted immigrant community. 
 
The positive rationale one hears among liberals in support of such il-
liberal restriction of the free exercise of religion is usually put in terms 
of the desirable enforced emancipation of young girls, if necessary 
against their expressed will, from gender discrimination and from pa-
triarchal control. This was the discourse on which the assassinated lib-
eral politician Pim Fortuyn built his electorally successful anti-
immigrant platform in liberal Holland, a campaign which is now bear-
ing fruit in new restrictive legislation. While conservative religious 
people are expected to tolerate behaviour they may consider morally 
abhorrent such as homosexuality, liberal secular Europeans are openly 
stating that European societies ought not to tolerate religious behav-
iour or cultural customs that are morally abhorrent in so far as they are 
contrary to modern liberal secular European norms. What makes the 
intolerant tyranny of the secular liberal majority justifiable in principle 
is not just the democratic principle of majority rule, but rather the 
secularist teleological assumption built into theories of modernization 
that one set of norms is reactionary, fundamentalist, and anti-modern, 
while the other set is progressive, liberal, and modern. 
 
33 22  Elaine Sciolino, "Debate Begins in France on Religion in the Schools", New 
York Times, 4 February 2004. 
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Does one need references to God or to its Christian heri-
tage in the new European constitution or does Europe need 
a new secular "civil religion" based on Enlightenment prin-
ciples? 
 
Strictly speaking, modern constitutions do not need transcendent ref-
erences nor is there much empirical evidence for the functionalist ar-
gument that the normative integration of modern differentiated socie-
ties requires some kind of "civil religion". In principle, there are three 
possible ways of addressing the quarrels provoked by the wording of 
the Preamble to the new European Constitution. The first option 
would be to avoid any controversy by relinquishing altogether the 
very project of drafting a self-defining preamble explaining to the 
world the political rationale and identity of the European Union. But 
such an option would be self-defeating in so far as the main rationale 
and purpose of drafting a new European constitution appears to be an 
extra-legal one, namely to contribute to European social integration, to 
enhance a common European identity, and to remedy the deficit in 
democratic legitimacy.33 33
                                                
  
 
A second alternative would be the mere enumeration of the basic 
common values that constitute the European "overlapping consensus", 
either as self-evident truths or as a social fact, without entering into 
the more controversial attempt to establish the normative foundation 
or to trace the genealogy of those European values. This was the op-
tion chosen by the signatories of the Declaration of American Inde-
pendence when they proclaimed "We Hold These Truths To Be Self-
Evident". But the strong rhetorical effect of this memorable phrase 
was predicated on the taken-for-granted belief in a Creator God who 
had endowed humans with inalienable rights, a belief shared by repub-
lican deists, Establishmentarian Protestants, and radical-pietist sectari-
ans alike. In our post-Christian and post-modern context, it is not that 
 
33 33  This point was forcefully made by Dieter Grimm at his keynote address, 
"Integration by Constitution – Juridical and Symbolic Perspectives of the 
European Constitution", at the Conference "Toward the Union of Europe – 
Cultural and Legal Ramifications", at New School University, New York, 5 
March 2004. 
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simple to conjure such self-evident "truths" that require no discursive 
grounding. The 2000 Solemn Proclamation of the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights of the European Union attempts to produce a similar 
effect with its opening paragraph: "Conscious of its spiritual and 
moral heritage, the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal val-
ues of human dignity, freedom, equality, and solidarity." But the proc-
lamation of those values as a basic social fact, as the common norma-
tive framework shared by most Europeans, could hardly have the de-
sired effect of grounding a common European political identity. It 
simply reiterates the already existing declarations of most national 
European constitutions, of the 1950 European Convention on Human 
Rights, and most importantly of the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights of the United Nations. Without addressing explicitly 
the thorny question of Europe's "spiritual and moral heritage" and its 
disputed role in the genesis of those supposedly "universal values", it 
is unlikely that such a proclamation can have the desired effect of in-
scribing those values as uniquely, particularly, or simply poignantly 
"European".  
 
The final and more responsible option would be to face the difficult 
and polemical task of defining through open and public debate the po-
litical identity of the new European Union: Who are we? Where do we 
come from? What constitutes our spiritual and moral heritage and the 
boundaries of our collective identities? How flexible internally and 
how open externally should those boundaries be? This would be under 
any circumstance an enormously complex task that would entail ad-
dressing and coming to terms with the many problematic and contra-
dictory aspects of the European heritage in its intra-national, inter-
European, and global-colonial dimensions. But such a complex task is 
made the more difficult by secularist prejudices that preclude not only 
a critical yet honest and reflexive assessment of the Judeo-Christian 
heritage, but even any public official reference to such a heritage, on 
the grounds that any reference to religion could be divisive and coun-
terproductive, or simply violates secular postulates. 
 
The purpose of my argument is not to imply that the new European 
constitution ought to make some reference to either some transcendent 
reality or to the Christian heritage, but simply to point out that the 
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quarrels provoked by the possible incorporation of some religious ref-
erent in the constitutional text would seem to indicate that secularist 
assumptions turn religion into a problem, and thus preclude the possi-
bility of dealing with religious issues in a pragmatic sensible manner. 
Firstly, I fully agree with Bronislaw Geremek that any geneological 
reconstruction of the idea or social imaginary of Europe that makes 
reference to Greco-Roman antiquity and the Enlightenment while 
erasing any memory of the role of Medieval Christendom in the very 
constitution of Europe as a civilization evinces either historical igno-
rance or repressive amnesia.3434   
 
Secondly, the inability to openly recognize Christianity as one of the 
constitutive components of European cultural and political identity 
means that a great historical opportunity may be missed to add yet a 
third important historical reconciliation to the already achieved recon-
ciliation between Protestant and Catholics and between warring Euro-
pean nation-states, by putting an end to the old battles over Enlight-
enment, religion, and secularism. The perceived threat to secular iden-
tities and the biased overreaction to exclude any public reference to 
Christianity belies the self-serving secularist claims that only secular 
neutrality can guarantee individual freedoms and cultural pluralism. 
What the imposed silence signifies is not only the attempt to erase 
Christianity or any other religion from the public collective memory, 
but also the exclusion from the public sphere of a central component 
of the personal identity of many Europeans. To guarantee equal access 
to the European public sphere and undistorted communication, the 
European Union would need to become not only post-Christian but 
also post-secular.3535
                                                
  
 
33 44  Bronislaw Geremek, "Welche Werte für das neue Europa?", Transit 26 
(2003/2004). 
33 55  Even in his new post-secular openness to the religious "other" and in his call 
for the secular side to remain "sensitive to the force of articulation inherent in 
religious languages", Jürgen Habermas still implies that religious believers 
must naturally continue to suffer disabilities in the secular public sphere. "To 
date, only citizens committed to religious beliefs are required to split up their 
identities, as it were, into their public and private elements. They are the ones 
who have to translate their religious beliefs into a secular language before 
their arguments have any chance of gaining majority support." Jürgen 
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Finally, the privileging of European secular identities and secularist 
self-understandings in the genealogical affirmation of the common 
European values of human dignity, equality, freedom, and solidarity 
may not only impede the possibility of gaining a full understanding of 
the genesis of those values and their complex process of societal insti-
tutionalization and individual internalization, but also preclude a criti-
cal and reflexive self-understanding of those secular identities. David 
Martin and Danièle Hervieu-Léger have poignantly shown that the re-
ligious and the secular are inextricably linked throughout modern 
European history, that the different versions of the European Enlight-
enment are inextricably linked with different versions of Christianity, 
and that cultural matrixes rooted in particular religious traditions and 
related institutional arrangements still serve to shape and encode, 
mostly unconsciously, diverse European secular practices.3636
                                                                                                                                                        
 The con-
scious and reflexive recognition of such a Christian encoding does not 
mean that one needs to accept the claims of the Pope or of any other 
ecclesiastical authority to be the sole guardians or legitimate adminis-
trators of the European Christian heritage. It only means to accept the 
right of every European, native and immigrant, to participate in the 
ongoing task of definition, renovation, and transmission of that heri-
tage. Ironically, as the case of French laic etatism shows, the more 
secularist self-understandings attempt to repress this religious heritage 
from the collective conscience, the more it reproduces itself subcon-
sciously and compulsively in public secular codes.  
 
The four issues analyzed in this paper, the integration of Catholic Po-
land in post-Christian Europe, the integration of Turkey into the Euro-
pean Union, the incorporation of non-European immigrants as full 
members of their European host societies and of the European Union, 
and the task of writing a new European constitution that both reflects 
the values of the European people and at the same time allows them to 
Habermas, "Faith and Knowlwdge", in The Future of Human Nature, 
Cambridge 2003, 109. Only by holding to a teleological philosophy of history 
can Habermas insist that "postsecular society continues the work, for religion 
itself, that religion did for myth" and that this work of "translation", or 
rational linguistification of the sacred, is the equivalent of "non-destructive 
secularization" and enlightenment. 
33 66  Transit 26 (2003/2004). 
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become a self-constituent European demos, all are problematic issues 
in themselves. But the paper has tried to show that unreflexive secular 
identities and secularist self-understandings turn those problematic is-
sues into even more perplexing and seemingly intractable "religious" 
problems. 
 
 
This text emerged from an independent working group named by 
European Commission President Romano Prodi and chaired by the 
Rector of Vienna's Institute for Human Sciences, Krzysztof Michalski. 
The group is charged with identifying the long-term spiritual and cul-
tural perspectives of the enlarged Europe. More information under 
www.iwm.at/r-reflec.htm. 
 
 
Published 2004-07-29 
Original in English  
First published in Transit 27 (2004) (German version) 
 
Contributed by Transit 
© José Casanova  
© Transit 
© Eurozine 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 95
BERICHTE (ISSN 0946-2988) 
 
 
  1. Fischer, Walter: Die Ausbildung im Fach Datenverarbeitung an 
den Fachhochschulen für öffentliche Verwaltung des Bundes und 
der Länder. 1983. 111 S. Vergriffen. 
  2. Fischer, Walter: Anwendung von Informationstechnik in der 
Verwaltungsausbildung. 1984. 54 S. Vergriffen. 
  3. Schmahl, Hans-Ludwig: Methoden und Arbeitstechniken in der 
öffentlichen Verwaltung. 4. überarb. Aufl. 1989. 61 S. 
  4. Buschmann, Horst: Ausländer und Verwaltung. Bestands-
aufnahme über das Lehrangebot an den Fachhochschulen für 
öffentliche Verwaltung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 1984. 
Getr. Zählung. Vergriffen. 
  5. Buschmann, Horst: Das Zivilrecht in der Ausbildung an den 
Fachhochschulen für den öffentlichen Dienst. 1985. 142 S. 
Vergriffen. 
  6. Kranz, Ursula: Verfahren und Modelle der hochschuldidak-
tischen Weiterbildung. 1987. 68 S. Vergriffen. 
  7. Verwaltung und Verwaltungsausbildung in den USA. Rupert 
Eilsberger (Hrsg.). 1988. 142 S. Vergriffen. 
  8. Staats- und verwaltungsrechtliche Probleme der deutschen Ein-
heit. Fortbildungsveranstaltung vom 23.-28.9.1992 in Biesenthal. 
1993. 79 S. Vergriffen. 
  9. Hansen, Klaus, und Kreppel, Peter: Fortbildung als Einigungs-
kunde: Erfahrungen aus 10 Fortbildungskursen der FH Bund für 
Probebeamte aus den neuen Bundesländern. 1994. 61 S. 
Vergriffen. 
10. Studentischer Widerstand gegen das NS-Regime: Die Weiße 
Rose. Ein Projekttag. Horst Schuh (Hrsg.). 1994. 38 S. Vergriffen. 
11. Lang, Eckart: Wegbereiter des modernen Haushaltsrechts. 1994. 
IV, 41 S. Vergriffen. 
 
 96
12. Möllers, Martin: Didaktische Aspekte zum Studium in bürgerna-
her Verwaltung. 1994. X, 11-97 S. Vergriffen. 
13. Dulisch, Frank: Standards für wissenschaftliche Hausarbeiten. 
1995. 39 S. Anl. 1-3. ISBN 3-930732-04-1. Vergriffen. 
14. Möllers, Martin: Ansätze zu einer Didaktik der Rechts-
wissenschaft an Fachhochschulen für öffentliche Verwaltung. 
1995. 81 S. ISBN 3-930732-03-3. Vergriffen. 
15. Dulisch, Frank: Einsatz von Skripten an Fachhochschulen für 
öffentliche Verwaltung. 1995. 55 S. ISBN 3-930732-05-X. 
16. Schmahl, Hans Ludwig: Entwicklungen des Ausländer- und 
Asylrechts in Deutschland. 1995. 74 S. ISBN 3-930732-09-2. 
Vergriffen. 
17. Fischer, Walter: Öffentliche Betriebswirtschaftslehre. Tat-
sächliche und geplante Studienangebote deutscher Fachhoch-
schulen. Stand: Herbst 1994. 1995. 114 S. ISBN 3-930732-10-6. 
Vergriffen. 
18. Saligmann, Jürgen: Die Verfassung Perus. Ein Vergleich. 1997. 
64 S. ISBN 3-930732-12-2. 
19. Projektarbeit in Gedenkstätten. Methodische Überlegungen und 
praktische Erfahrungen. Eine Tagung in Gedenkstätte und 
Museum Sachsenhausen. Hrsg.: Ursula Blanke und Horst Schuh. 
1995. 67 S. ISBN 3-930732-15-7. Vergriffen. 
20. Verwaltungsreform. Stichworte, Einwürfe, Argumente. Heinz-
Peter Gerhardt, Hans-Peter Schwöbel (Hrsg.). 1996. 132 S. ISBN 
3-930732-22-X. Vergriffen. 
21. Schmahl, Hans Ludwig: Der verwaltungsrechtliche Vertrag. 
1997. 51 S. ISBN 3-930732-29-7. Vergriffen. 
22 Gerhardt, Heinz-Peter: Zur sozialen Kompetenz von Bundes-
beamten. 1998. 125 S. ISBN 3-930732-34-3. 
23. Leipelt, Detlef: Bericht über einen Praxisaufenthalt bei der 
Koordinierungs- und Beratungsstelle der Bundesregierung für 
Informationstechnik in der Bundesverwaltung im Bundesmini-
sterium des Innern. 1998. 61 S. ISBN 3-930732-35-1. 
 
 97
24. Umsetzung der Empfehlungen des Wissenschaftsrates zur 
weiteren Entwicklung der verwaltungsinternen Fachhochschulen. 
Dokumentation der Beschlüsse des Senats der Fachhochschule 
des Bundes für öffentliche Verwaltung. 1999. ISBN 3-930732-50-
5. 
25. Die Europäische Union an der Schwelle des 3. Jahrtausends. 
Kolloquium anlässlich des zwanzigjährigen Bestehens der 
Fachhochschule des Bundes am 20. Oktober 1999. Hans Ludwig 
Schmahl (Hrsg.). 2000. 70 S. ISBN 3-930732-60-2. Vergriffen. 
26. Europa-Aufbau-Studium mit Master-Abschluss. Ein Entwurf 
des Zentralbereichs der Fachhochschule des Bundes für 
öffentliche Verwaltung. Hans Ludwig Schmahl (Hrsg.). 2000. 74 
S. ISBN 3-930732-65-3. Vergriffen. 
27. Evaluation an der FH Bund. Frank Dulisch / Friedhelm Linssen / 
Hans Gerd Reiter (Hrsg.). 2001. 46 S. ISBN 3-930732-72-6. 
28. Schmidt, Manfred: Polizei und Islam: Ratschläge für die 
polizeiliche Praxis. Mit einem Vorwort von Heinz-Peter Gerhardt. 
2001. 74 S. ISBN 3-930732-74-2. Vergriffen. 
28. Schmidt, Manfred: Polizei und Islam: Ratschläge für die 
polizeiliche Praxis. Mit einem Vorwort von Heinz-Peter Gerhardt. 
2. überarb. Auflage 2002. 81 S. ISBN 3-930732-82-3. Vergriffen. 
29. Schorr, Annette: Nutzung von PC und Internet. Ergebnisse einer 
Befragung von Studienanfängern der FH Bund in Brühl. 2003. 54 
S. ISBN 3-930732-84-X. 
30. Evaluation an der FH Bund. Konzepte und Ergebnisse aus den 
Fachbereichen. Sven Max Litzcke / Friedhelm Linssen / Frank 
Dulisch (Hrsg.). 2004. 329 S. ISBN 3-930732-95-5. 
31. Schmahl, Ludwig: Bundesbeamte und Europafähigkeit. Vorträge 
im Rahmen des Masterstudiengangs „Europäisches Verwaltungs-
management“. 2004. 42 S. ISBN 3-938407-00-X. Vergriffen. 
32. Lehre an der FH Bund zukunftsfähig gestalten. Ergebnisse der 
Studienplankommission. Sven Max Litzcke / Friedhelm Linssen 
(Hrsg.). 2005. 74 S. ISBN 3-938407-06-9. 
 98
 99
                                                
33. Eckpunkte und Kernelemente für Bachelorstudiengänge der FH 
Bund. Empfehlungen der Studienplankommission. Rainer Al-
brecht / Friedhelm Linssen (Hrsg.). 2006. 80 S. ISBN 3-938407-
15-8. 
34. Integration von Migranten. Intentionen, Programme, Perspek-
tiven. Ludwig Schmahl (Hrsg.). 2007. 118 S. ISBN 978-3-
938407-19-6. 
35. Beschorner, Jürgen: Die neuen Bildungsprogramme der EU. 
Beteiligungskonzepte für Hochschulen. 2008. 50 S. ISBN 978-3-
938407-28-8. 
 
 
 
 
